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ABSTRACT
Recent regulatory changes have introduced more transparency to healthcare practice
and marketing. The intention of these regulatory changes is to help consumers make
more informed decisions, to reduce healthcare costs, and to resolve conflict-of-interest
issues. My work in this area aims to understand if and to what extent such regulations
achieve the desired goals, and in what ways firms and physicians are impacted. In
addition, my work also investigates whether there are unintended consequences of such
regulation.
My dissertation studies the disclosure of a specific form of information: marketing
payments to physicians from pharmaceutical firms and their rivals. In two essays,
I investigate how making this information public changes physician prescriptions and
firm payments, as well as whether there are unintended consequences of such regulation.
In the first essay of my dissertation, “Let the Sun Shine In: The Impact of Industry
Payment Disclosure on Physician Prescription Behavior”, I provide evidence on the
effectiveness of increased transparency of physicians’ industry financial ties in reducing
physician prescriptions. Specifically, I use individual-level claims data from a major
provider of health insurance in the U.S. and employ a difference-in-difference research
design to study the effect of the payment disclosure law introduced in Massachusetts
in June 2009. The research design exploits the fact that while physicians operating in
Massachusetts were impacted by the legislation, their counterparts in the neighboring
states of Connecticut and New York were not. In order to keep the groups of physicians
comparable, I restrict my analysis to the physicians in the counties that are on the
border of these states. I find that the Massachusetts disclosure law resulted in a
x
decline in prescriptions in all three drug classes studied: statins, antidepressants, and
antipsychotics. My findings are robust under alternative controls, time periods, and
variable transformations. I show that the effect is highly heterogeneous across brands
and physician groups, and that the decrease in prescription is unlikely due to changes
in financial incentives.
In the second essay, “The Effect of Information Disclosure on Industry Payments
to Physicians”, I seek answer to the following question: does disclosing industry pay-
ment information influence subsequent payments to physicians? I quantify the impact
of information disclosure during 2014-2015 (after ACA Physician Open Payment Act)
on direct-to-physician payments. In essence, I use a quasi-experimental difference-in-
difference research design to find control ”clones” for every physician-product pair in
the states with and without prior disclosure laws, facilitated by recent advances in
machine learning methods. The novel algorithm (Wager and Athey, 2017) is computa-
tionally efficient and robust to model mis-specifications, while preserving consistency
and asymptotic normality. Using a 29-month national panel covering $100 million
in payments between 16 anti-diabetics brands and 50,000 physicians, I find that the
monthly payments declined by 2% on average due to disclosure. However, there is con-
siderable heterogeneity in the treatment effects with 14% of the drug-physician pairs
showing a significant increase in their monthly payment. Moreover, the decline in pay-
ment is smaller among drugs with larger marketing expenditure, and among physicians
who were paid more heavily pre-disclosure and prescribed more heavily. Thus, while
information disclosure did lead to reduction in payments on average (as intended by
policy makers), the effect is limited on big drugs and popular physicians. I further
explore potential mechanisms that are consistent with the data pattern.
xi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Recent regulatory changes have introduced more transparency to healthcare practice
and marketing. The intention of these regulatory changes is to help consumers make
more informed decisions, to reduce healthcare costs, and to resolve conflict-of-interest
issues. My work in this area aims to understand if and to what extent such regulations
achieve the desired goals, and in what ways firms and physicians are impacted. In
addition, my work also investigates whether there are unintended consequences of such
regulation.
My dissertation studies the disclosure of a specific form of information: marketing
payments to physicians from pharmaceutical firms and their rivals. In two essays,
I investigate how making this information public changes physician prescriptions and
firm payments, as well as whether there are unintended consequences of such regulation.
In the first essay of my dissertation, “Let the Sun Shine In: The Impact of In-
dustry Payment Disclosure on Physician Prescription Behavior”, I provide evidence
on the effectiveness of increased transparency of physicians industry financial ties in
reducing physician prescriptions. Using data from a large, national US health insurer
(OptumInsight De-identified ClinformaticsTM Data Mart), I exploit the natural exper-
iment occurred in Massachusetts in 2009, where physicians operating in Massachusetts
were required to disclose marketing payments from firms, but their counterparts in
the neighboring states of Connecticut and New York were not. To address concerns
about the differential trend between MA and the control states, I use the generalized
synthetic control method to match physicians in MA with a convex combination of
physicians in CT and NY based on their pre-period prescription behavior. I find that
information disclosure has led to a decline in branded prescriptions by 40%-59% for
statins, antidepressants, and antipsychotics, with heavier prescribers and more popular
brands being influenced the most. Interestingly, the prescriptions of generic drugs in
the three classes declined as well, although the magnitude of decline is smaller than that
of branded prescriptions. Since manufacturers of generic drugs do not typically make
1
payments to physicians, this result suggests that the change in prescription behavior
is unlikely to be related to changes in payment structure as a result of the disclosure
of these payments. Rather, the decrease in prescription is possibly a consequence of
increased self-monitoring among physicians to curb over-diagnosis.
In the second essay, “The Effect of Information Disclosure on Industry Payments
to Physicians”, I seek answer to the following question: does disclosing industry pay-
ment information influence subsequent payments to physicians? I quantify the im-
pact of information disclosure during 2014-2015 (after ACA Physician Open Payment
Act) on direct-to-physician payments, using machine learning technique with quasi-
experimental research design. The technique effectively matches the treated and the
control units while circumventing the curse of dimensionality in traditional paramet-
ric matching methods. This allows me to obtain individual-level estimates with good
asymptotic properties that are robust to irrelevant features. Using a 29-month na-
tional panel covering $100 million in payments between 16 anti-diabetics brands and
50,000 physicians, I find that the monthly payments declined by 2% on average due
to disclosure. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the treatment effects
with 14% of the drug-physician pairs showing a significant increase in their monthly
payment. Moreover, the decline in payment is smaller among drugs with larger mar-
keting expenditure, and among physicians who were paid more heavily pre-disclosure
and prescribed more heavily. Thus, while information disclosure did lead to reduction
in payments on average (as intended by policy makers), the effect is limited on big
drugs and popular physicians. I present a data pattern consistent with the idea that
firms respond to information about competitive payments by trying to differentiate
themselves.
My dissertation contributes to our knowledge of the consequences from the well-
publicized disclosure laws. In my first essay, I provide evidence that disclosure laws
decrease physician prescriptions in both a statistically and economically significant
manner. In my second essay, I provide evidence that while public disclosure of pay-
ment information led to a reduction in overall payments, the effect is muted for heavily
prescribing physicians and heavily marketed drugs. My dissertation offers two take-
aways for regulators. First, regulators may want to re-evaluate whether the benefit
from the intervention justifies its costs. Second, firm differentiation possibly plays a
big role in explaining the impact of disclosing marketing expenditure in other indus-
tries, too. As FTC is pushing for sponsorship disclosure in social influencer marketing,
findings in my dissertation warn regulators about the possible increased dominance of
high-paying brands among Opinion Leader voices due to differentiation.
2
CHAPTER 2
”Let the Sun Shine In”: The Impact of
Industry Payment Disclosure on Physician
Prescription Behavior
2.1 Introduction
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry spent more than $6 billion as marketing payments
to physicians during 2013 - 2015.1 These direct payments (consulting/speaking fees,
conference/meal reimbursements) are pervasive with 75% of U.S. physicians receiving
at least one payment from a company in a year.2 Extant academic research has doc-
umented a relationship between prescribed drugs and payments (Yeh et al., 2016; De-
Jong et al., 2016), calling into question the unbiasedness of physician decision-making
(Campbell et al., 2007; Agrawal et al., 2013; Kesselheim et al., 2013; Perry et al., 2014).
Concerned about higher healthcare costs and lower patient welfare due to conflict of
interest (Manchanda and Honka, 2013; Carey et al., 2015; Engelberg et al., 2014; Gro-
chowski Jones and Ornstein, 2016), policy-makers have been pushing for full disclosure
of these payments. Several states introduced disclosure laws (“the Sunshine law”) that
require companies to report physician payments to the state government (Chimonas
et al., 2010; Pham-Kanter et al., 2012)3 followed by the federal government in 2013 (as
part of the Affordable Care Act). The idea behind these laws is that increased public
scrutiny as a result of the disclosure might persuade firms to decrease these payments
or render physicians less willing to accept them (Chen et al., 2016). To the extent that
payments are related to a greater propensity to prescribe branded drugs, the potential
1From OpenPayment data from CMS. https://openpaymentsdata.cms.gov/summary
2See https://www.propublica.org/article/doctors-who-take-company-cash-tend-to-prescribe-more-
brand-name-drugs
3These states include: Maine (2004), West Virginia (2004), Minnesota (1993), Massachusetts
(2008), Vermont (2001), and District of Columbia (2003).
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reduction in payments as a result of disclosure could lead to lower healthcare costs
(e.g., by motivating physicians to switch from prescribing branded to generic drugs).
On the other hand, critics of disclosure argue that it will relieve physicians of the guilt
around biased prescriptions by providing a “moral license” (assuming a bias exists)
(Cain et al., 2005, 2011). At the same time, disclosure can lead to unintended negative
consequences for patient welfare due to the overall decrease in physician willingness
to prescribe any drug (Sade, 2011; Santhakumar and Adashi, 2015). This is because
physicians may prescribe more conservatively to avoid the inference the public may
draw from the disclosed financial relationship with firms, even when there is no change
in how much they are paid. Taken together, these diverse viewpoints make it hard to
predict the impact of disclosure.
In this paper, I evaluate the effect of enforced payment disclosure on physician pre-
scription behavior. To this end, I exploit the introduction of the Massachusetts Open
Payment law that went into effect in July 2009 to study how physician prescription
behavior changed as a result of enforced payment disclosure. The data used in my
analysis come from one of the largest health insurance companies in the U.S. I use
outpatient prescription information at the claim level during a four-year period be-
tween January 2008 and December 2011. This allows me to track the number of new
prescriptions and refills written by each physician for various drugs over time for all the
patients affiliated with the insurance provider. I study prescription behavior in three
therapeutic classes that receive the highest levels of marketing spending - statins, an-
tidepressants and antipsychotics (Campbell, 2009). Note that I do not study the effect
of the change in payments on physician prescription behavior as I do not have access
to payment data before the disclosure took effect.
My identification of the effect of disclosure legislation relies on the change in new
prescriptions by physicians located in Massachusetts (MA) after the policy interven-
tion, relative to their counterparts from “control” states where no such law existed
at the same time period. To ensure that the physicians in these “control” states are
comparable, I focus on physicians located in the border counties of Massachusetts and
Connecticut (CT). The idea is that the physicians in these border counties should have
patient pools with similar need for treatment, but show differential impact in response
to the legislation depending on the side of the border they are located. My empirical
strategy is to examine the change in behavior using pre- and post-comparisons via
a panel data specification that includes physician and time fixed effects. I use three
different temporal points to characterize the change from pre to post as compliance
with the disclosure law occurred in a phased manner. These three points are: (1) July
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1, 2009 - when firms began to prepare their internal data for submission under the
law, (2) July 1, 2010 - when the firms first reported their payment information to the
government, and (3) November 22, 2010 - when the data were made available to the
public. The use of these three time points also acts as a “temporal robustness check.”
Finally, in order to ensure that my findings are robust to my definition of the control
group, I carry out two additional checks. In the first robustness check, I use the border
counties of another neighboring state, New York (NY), as a control. In the second, I
use the generalized synthetic control method to create a control group that is as close
pre-treatment to the treatment group as possible.
My results reveal that, on average, the disclosure law resulted in a decline in the
prescription of branded drugs in Massachusetts. Specifically, the intervention led to a
48%-59% decrease for branded statins, a 46%-54% decrease for branded antidepress-
sants, and a 40%-45% decrease for branded antipsychotics when I consider physicians
in the MA-CT border counties.4 The result is robust to my definition of the con-
trol group: I replicate virtually all my findings when I use physicians in the NY border
counties or against the constructed synthetic control group. The results are also robust
to alternative definitions of the policy change (the three temporal breaks) and choice
of model specification. Interestingly, we find that the prescriptions of generic drugs in
all three drug classes also declined as a result of the disclosure - statins by 38%-46%,
antidepressants by 32%-41% and generic antipsychotics by 38%-40%. In addition, my
results suggest that heavy prescribers in each drug class exhibited a greater tendency
to shift their prescriptions away from branded drugs (relative to generics) as a result
of the disclosure. When I consider differences across brands within each therapeutic
class, I find that the relative magnitude of the drop in prescriptions was larger among
higher market share brands. Overall, these results suggest that the disclosure law was
effective in reducing the total number of prescriptions and possibly in driving physi-
cians to substitute away from branded drugs to generics. These results are among the
first to provide empirical evidence that disclosure laws had an impact on physician
prescription behavior, both in a statistical and economic sense.
As noted earlier, given that I do not observe direct payments before disclosure
went into effect, I cannot draw any definitive conclusions on whether the decrease in
prescriptions is related to changes in payments made by pharmaceutical companies.
However, as noted above, a surprising finding is that, in addition to the branded drugs,
4While the extent of the drop seems large, it is consistent with previous research on changes in
physician prescription behavior as a function of other environmental changes e.g., King and Bearman,
2013. I discuss this in detail in 2.4.5.
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prescriptions of generic drugs in the three therapeutic classes also declined as a result
of disclosure. Since manufacturers of generic drugs do not usually make payments
to physicians, this result suggests that the change in prescription behavior is unlikely
to be related to changes in payment structure arising from disclosure. I further test
whether the decline in prescriptions is associated with payments by exploring whether
physicians in locations (ZIP codes) that receive more payments from pharmaceutical
companies are also more prone to decreasing their prescriptions of branded drugs. The
premise is that if (a) prescriptions are tied to payments and (b) payments change as
a result of the legislation, the effect of the legislation on prescriptions is likely to be
larger among physicians that receive higher payments. I find that this relationship is
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the change in prescription behavior might not
be related to adjustments in payment structure as a result of the legislation. Rather,
the results support the notion that the change in prescription behavior was driven by
self-monitoring among physicians to curb “over-diagnosis,” rather than a change in how
firms deliver payments. While on the one hand, this may be seen as a “good” outcome
i.e., lower prescriptions especially of branded drugs are likely to reduce health care
costs, there could be “bad” aspects in that self-monitoring may shift physicians from
“over-diagnosis” to “under prescribing,” leading perhaps to worse health outcomes.
Thus, the contribution of this paper is in establishing what happened and proposing
some explanations for why it happened, setting the stage for further investigation by
researchers and policy makers into the benefits and costs of the legislation.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the institutional
background of the policy intervention in Massachusetts and describes the data. Section
2.3 explains the identification strategy and empirical specification. Section 2.4 reports
and discusses the findings. Section 2.5 concludes and suggests directions for future
research.
2.2 Institutional Setting and Data
2.2.1 Background
The Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Manufacturer Code of Conduct, or Mas-
sachusetts Marketing Code of Conduct, was created in 2008 to promote “cost contain-
ment, transparency and efficiency in the delivery of quality health care.”5 It incorpo-
rated requirements from the voluntary code of conduct of the Pharmaceutical Research
5http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/magazine/ma_s2863.pdf
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and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the Advanced Medical Technology As-
sociation (AdvaMed). Effective from July 1, 2009, it required “all pharmaceutical and
medical device manufacturers that employ or contract with any person to sell or market
prescription drugs or medical devices in Massachusetts” to collect and report certain
financial transactions related to marketing activities with Massachusetts health care
providers. The policy came into effect over a series of steps between July 2009 and
November 2010:
1. Starting on July 1st, 2009, the companies were required to establish compliance
and training programs for their sales and marketing agents regarding the Mas-
sachusetts Marketing Code of Conduct.
2. On July 1st, 2010, the companies reported the first wave of ”the value, nature,
purpose and particular recipient of any fee, payment, subsidy or other economic
benefit with a value of at least $50” with Massachusetts-licensed health care
providers.6 Payments in conjunction with genuine research and clinical trials,
prescription drugs for use by patients exclusively, demonstration units, items for
charity care, royalties and licensing fees based on intellectual property agree-
ments, and price concessions such as discounts and rebates, are exempt from
disclosure.7 For July 1, 2010, transactions for the period July 1, 2009 through
December 31, 2009 were reported. In each year thereafter, the disclosures will
cover a full calendar year of transactions.
3. On Nov 22, 2010, Massachusetts Office of Health and Human Services set up the
online query website to public that allows consumers to look at prepared reports,
carry out customized searches by company, physician, year, payment category
and amount, or keywords, and/or download the whole dataset. At that point
in time, Massachusetts was the first state to open up an online database of firm
payments to physicians publicly. Figure A.2 shows a snapshot of the customizable
search engine.
6http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/departments/dph/programs/hcq/healthcare-quality/
pharm-code-of-conduct/information-for-consumers.html
7http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/quality/healthcare/pharm-medical-device-conduct-faq.
pdf
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2.2.2 Data
2.2.2.1 Prescription Data
My prescription data come from De-identified Clinformatics™ Data Mart Database
(provided by OptumInsight Inc.) from a large, national US health insurer.8 The data
contain all outpatient prescription claims made on behalf of the beneficiaries enrolled
with the insurer in the United States during 2006-2011. For each claim, I observe
four sets of data: a) system-encrypted physician unique ID ; b) drug information,
including names, therapeutic class, National Drug Code, indicator for whether the drug
is branded or a generic; c) prescription information, including fill date, indicator for
whether this is a new prescription, quantity dispensed, days of supply, and maximum
number of refills; d) standardized cost information. In addition, I observe some patient
characteristics such as their age (capped at 90), gender, zipcode of residence, starting
date of the membership, the insurance coverage type (e.g. HMO, PPO, etc.) they are
enrolled in and all the prescription claims filed on their behalf. I further pair my data
with FDA National Drug Code database to obtain manufacturer information (http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm142438.htm). This information, along
with data from FDA Orange Book, allow me to identify whether a drug is branded or
a generic equivalent.
2.2.2.2 Sample Preparation and Summary Statistics
As discussed in the Introduction, I consider physicians located at the border of Mas-
sachusetts and another New England state, Connecticut. Specifically, I choose four
counties from Connecticut (Litchfield, Hartford, Tolland, Windham) and three coun-
ties from Massachusetts (Hampden, Berkshire and Worcester). Two of the counties
in MA, Berkshire and Worcester extend all the way up to the state’s northern border
with Vermont and New Hampshire. For these two counties, I only include physicians
operating in ZIP codes within 30 miles of the MA-CT border (see Figure 2.1 for a
map).
The idea behind restricting my analysis to physicians in the border counties is that
they will have similar characteristics and face patient pools with comparable needs for
prescription drugs in different classes. I check the population in these border coun-
ties in terms of their demographic and socio-economic characteristics, health insurance
coverage, and educational attainment in Table 2.1. These data suggest that the popu-
8Due to the presence of a non-disclosure agreement, I am unable to reveal the name or the exact
market share of the insurer.
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lation on either side of the MA-CT border are comparable in terms of demographic and
socio-economic characteristics, health insurance coverage, and educational attainment.
Therefore, the premise that the physicians operating in these areas should face patient
pools with similar need for prescription medication appears to have face validity. In my
empirical analysis, I also include the number of patients that each physician receives
over time as a covariate in order to control for changes in their need to prescribe drugs.
As noted earlier, I do not observe the Zip codes where each physician operates
in my data. Therefore, I infer this from the location information of each physician’s
patient pool from Massachusetts and Connecticut, before the policy intervention comes
into effect. I first identified all physicians who have prescribed for Massachusetts and
Connecticut patients during 2006-2009. I then assigned each physician to the modal
zipcode where most of her patients resided. I exclude 12% of physicians that draw a
significant number of patients from both states. This leaves me with 7,504 physicians
in Connecticut and 5,918 in Massachusetts.
I investigate the impact of disclosure on new prescriptions for three chronic drug
classes: statins, antidepressants, and antipsychotics. I choose these drug classes for
the following reasons. First, antihyperlipidemic agents (to which statins belong) and
antidepressants are among the top three most-prescribed categories of drugs in the
U.S. during the 2008-2011 time period. These categories account for 5.3% and 4.1% of
the total prescriptions in my data, respectively. These numbers are substantial given
that the average market share of a drug category in my data is about 0.3%. I include
antipsychotics as the third category because it saw a significant increase in prescriptions
between 2008 and 2011. Two of the popular drugs in this class, Abilify and Seroquel,
ranked among the top five best selling drugs during the 2008-2011 period (https:
//www.drugs.com/top200_2009.html). Second, there are no OTC drugs in these
three drug classes, which implies that they can only be obtained against a physician
prescription. Thus, I can characterize drug usage in these classes based on the insurance
claims data alone. Moreover, the impact of marketing in these three drug classes has
received some attention in the literature (e.g. Shapiro, 2016).
Within each drug class, I focus on new prescriptions and renewals written by the
physicians in my sample. Unlike refills within existing prescriptions, new prescriptions
and renewals represent active decisions by physicians because they usually involve eval-
uation of a patient’s condition and their responsiveness to the treatment. Admittedly,
there might be greater inertia with renewals compared to new prescriptions, suggesting
that the impact of the legislation is likely to be muted for renewals compared to new
prescriptions. To rule out the effect of inertia, one can restrict the analysis to the first
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prescription that a patient receives in that particular drug class. However, my data
do not allow me to infer the date when a patient starts taking prescription drugs in
a given therapeutic class. Nevertheless, if I do find that physicians changed their pre-
scription behavior subsequent to the legislation despite combining new prescriptions
and renewals, the effect would have been stronger if I had only considered the former.
In my empirical analysis, I keep the border physicians who have prescribed any
of these three drug classes during January 2008 - December 2011, and aggregate new
prescriptions and renewals by brand to the monthly level for each physician. I also
record the monthly total patients receiving a new prescription (from all locations and
all drug classes) for each physician in order to infer the size of the physician’s monthly
patient pool. Table 2.2 summarizes the number of physicians, drugs, branded drugs,
and zipcodes in my sample, while Table 2.3 reports summary statistics on monthly
total new prescriptions per class and monthly total patients per physician. Between
January 2008 and December 2011, an average physician from MA border prescribes
0.09 branded statins (0.19 for CT physicians), 0.03 branded antidepressants (0.11 for
CT physicians), and 0.18 branded antipsychotics (0.22 for CT physicians) per month.
The data in Table 2.3 also reveal that the physicians vary significantly in terms of the
size of their patient pool.
I treat January 2008 -June 2009, i.e., before the pharmaceutical started collecting
payment data for disclosure as the pre-treatment period. Table 2.4 shows that during
the pre-period, MA and the control states follow similar time trends in average monthly
prescriptions across statins and antidepressants. The only exception is antipsychotics.
I discuss further robustness checks for this concern in section 2.3.2.1.9 The raw data
patterns of monthly prescriptions per physician in Figure 2.2 suggest that the level dif-
ference between Massachusetts and Connecticut prescriptions enlarges from pre-period
to post-period, in all three drug classes. Specifically, in the post period, the number of
generic and branded prescriptions per physician increases considerably in Connecticut.
On the other hand, when I consider Massachusetts, the number of branded prescrip-
tions per physician either remained constant or decreased post legislation. Although
generic prescriptions increased marginally in MA, the magnitude was much smaller
compared to CT. Together, these data suggest that the disclosure law might have had
a negative impact on prescriptions.
There are two possible alternative explanations for this pattern: (a) there was an
9As a robustness check, I perform additional analyses based on the synthetic control method that
matches physicians in MA with a convex combination of physicians in CT and NY based on their
pre-period prescription behavior. This analysis should address concerns about this differential trend
between MA and the control states for antipsychotics.
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exodus of patients from the insurance company that provided me the data in MA
and/or (b) growth in the number of patients enrolled with the insurance provider in
CT. In my empirical analysis, I control for the size of the patient pool for each physician
in order to address these concerns.
2.3 Research Design
In order to understand the effect of their introduction on prescriptions written by
physicians, I exploit the idea that while some states like MA instituted payment dis-
closure laws, many of other states did not. Specifically, I consider how physicians in
MA changed the number and composition of prescriptions they wrote in three different
drug classes - statins, antidepressants, and antipsychotics - subsequent to the legis-
lation. However, this difference would also include any change in prescriptions that
might have occurred even in the absence of the policy intervention. Therefore, I use a
difference-in-difference (DID) specification by comparing the changes among physicians
in MA (i.e., the treated state) vs. those in a neighboring state, i.e., CT (the control
state). As noted earlier, I focus on physicians in counties on the border of MA and
CT in order to ensure that the two physician groups are comparable. This approach
of using contiguous border areas, has been used to investigate the impact of inter-
ventions in multiple domains (Holmes, 1998; Tucker et al., 2013; Card and Krueger,
1994, 2000; Dube et al., 2010; Shapiro, 2015). The identifying assumption is that the
physicians located along the border have similar characteristics and face patient pop-
ulations with similar need for prescriptions in these three drug classes. Recall that the
data in Table 2.1 support the notion that the border counties are comparable in terms
of demographic and socio-economic characteristics as well as private health insurance
enrollment. Therefore, any differential trends in physician prescriptions for the three
drug classes between the two sides of the state border result only from differences in
the policy change. In addition, I also verified that during the time period under study,
there was no reported drug supply chain disruptions (e.g., shortages), public health
condition shocks or entry of new brands that vary across counties in Massachusetts
and Connecticut.
I consider the number of prescriptions written by each physician during a 48-month
period between January 2008 and December 2011. Recall that the MA disclosure law
came into effect in discrete steps over time. This creates some ambiguity in terms of
how I should define treatment, i.e., the introduction of the disclosure law in MA. As
is suggested in Goldfarb and Tucker, 2014, I check sensitivity of the results to three
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different definitions of post treatment periods based on the various temporal cutoffs
related to the introduction of disclosure. Thus, the pre-period and three sets of post-
periods are as follows: pre-treatment period (T0 ≤ 18): January 1, 2008 - June 30, 2009;
Post-treatment period 1 (19 ≤ T1 ≤ 48): July 1, 2009 - Dec 31, 2011, i.e., after the law came
into effect; Post-treatment period 2 (31 ≤ T2 ≤ 48), i.e., after the pharmaceutical companies
reported the first set of payment data: July 1, 2010 - Dec 31, 2011; Post-treatment period 3
(36 ≤ T3 ≤ 48): Nov 22, 2010 - Dec 31, 2011, i.e., after the payment information was made
available to the public. This enables me to assess the robustness of my results to multiple
measures of policy intervention. In similar vein, studying the effect of disclosure laws on
prescriptions in three different drug classes helps me assess whether the key results
exhibit a generalizable pattern. In addition, I verify robustness in two different ways:
(a) using NY as an alternative control state and (b) using synthetic controls to identify
a convex combination of units within the control state (i.e., CT) that are similar in
terms of pre-intervention prescription trends to the corresponding units in the control
state (i.e., MA).
2.3.1 Physician Panel Regression
As mentioned above, I consider prescriptions written by each physician over a 48-month
period. In the first set of analyses, I aggregate prescriptions into two broad groups:
branded and generic. Let i index physicians, s index state, b index the type of drug
(branded or generic), and t index month 1 to 48. Let Rxibt indicate the average monthly
new prescriptions written by physician i from state s for branded/generic drugs in a
given class in month t. I first estimate the following specification:
Rxibt = αbIsIt + λbt + Iib +Xitβ + ibt, (2.1)
where Is are state-specific fixed effects and It is a post-treatment indicator variable that
equals 1 if t ≥ 18 and 0 otherwise. The coefficients αbranded and αgeneric capture the
causal impact of policy intervention on the prescriptions of branded and generic drugs
by Massachusetts physicians. A negative αbranded indicates that the policy intervention
discourages physicians from prescribing more (expensive) branded drugs. I include
physician-brand fixed effects, Iib to control for systematically different demand levels
across physicians for branded versus generic drugs. Similarly, I control for temporal
trends in prescriptions that are common across the treated and control states but
different across brands, by including λbt, a series of brand-specific month dummies.
Moreover, recall that my data pertain to prescription claims made on behalf of patients
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that are enrolled in insurance plans offered by the focal firm. Therefore, I may observe
changes in prescription claims as the number of enrollees changes over time. I control for
changes in the number of enrollees over time by including the total number of patients
receiving any new prescriptions (beyond the three therapeutic classes being studied)
from each physician in month t as a covariate, Xit. I cluster errors by physicians.
I expand the above analysis in two ways. First, I consider whether the effect of
the disclosure law varied across brands within each drug class. To this end, I consider
prescriptions at the individual brand level rather than aggregating all the branded
drugs into one group as in my earlier analysis. With each therapeutic class, I consider
the top 2 or 3 brands and lump the remaining brands into an omnibus brand of “other.”
Specifically, in antidepressants and antipsychotics, the top three brands contribute to
90% of total branded prescriptions. Therefore, I have four brands after I consider these
three brands and the composite “other.” On the other hand, in statins, I only consider
top 2 brands (Lipitor and Crestor) as they contribute to more than 96% of all branded
statin prescriptions. All other brands of statins are combined into the composite brand
category. As in the first analysis, I treat all generics as the final “brand”.
My conjecture is that larger brands are likely to have higher marketing budgets,
including resources allocated towards physician payments. If disclosure laws render
firms reluctant to make payments or curtail physicians’ willingness to accept payments,
I would expect larger firms to experience a greater adverse effect. Especially, this is
likely to be the case when payments are related to prescriptions by physicians. Even if
payments are not directly related to prescriptions, if prescriptions decline as a result of
the disclosure law, larger brands, by virtue of their relative size, are likely to contribute
more to the decline.
Second, I explore the heterogeneous effects of the policy intervention on light,
medium and heavy prescribers. As noted earlier, I divide physicians in each state
into three equal sized groups on each side of the state border based on their total pre-
scriptions within the corresponding class during January 2006 - Jun 2009 (i.e., before
any treatment occurs).10 The premise behind this analysis is that heavier prescribers
are more likely to be the target of payments by firms. Therefore, if the disclosure
law resulted in lower payments, these physicians are likely to change their prescription
behavior. Moreover, heavier prescribers are likely to be more risk-averse and tend to
overestimate the need for medication. Therefore, I expect them to be the most respon-
sive to the policy intervention by cutting down the excessive prescriptions. In order to
10I also check robustness by using an alternative definition of groups based on fixed number of
prescriptions on both sides of the state border.
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capture this difference in responsiveness to the policy intervention, I estimate different
treatment effects (one for branded and one for generic) for each physician group g
separately:
Rxict = α
b
gIsIt + λbt + Iib +Xitβ + ibt. (2.2)
Thus, I investigate the relative magnitude of the policy influence on the tendency
to prescribe any branded or generic drugs across the three physician groups (αbrandedg ,
αgenericg ), for g ∈ {light,medium, high}. Note that in this specification, the state main
effects have been absorbed by physician-drug dummies (Iib), and the post-treatment
main effect has been absorbed by drug-month dummies(λbt).
2.3.2 Robustness Checks
I expand the basic research design outlined above by performing a series of robustness
checks following Goldfarb and Tucker, 2014. First, in order to rule out the possibility
that any treatment effect recovered in the above analysis is idiosyncratic to the choice of
CT as the control state, I replicate the analyses with NY as an alternative control state.
As in the case of MA-CT, I consider physicians that are located in the counties along
the MA-NY border. The second robustness check was motivated by changes introduced
by some insurers in MA. Specifically, starting in January 2009, Blue Cross Blue Shield
of MA introduced Alternative Quality Contract in Massachusetts, which sought to
compensate physicians based on health outcomes rather than treatments. Since my
data are from a different insurance company that did not institute a similar change,
my analysis should not be influenced by changes made by Blue Cross Blue Shield.
Nevertheless, I check robustness of my findings by using a pre-period that excludes
data prior to the introduction of the alternative quality contract, i.e., I use Jan-Jun
2009 as an alternative pre-period. By considering data only after the introduction
of the alternative quality contract, I rule out its influence in driving any changes in
prescriptions in MA.
Third, since I am considering prescriptions at the individual physician level, there
are many months with zero prescriptions. The problem is more acute when I consider
prescriptions at the individual brand level. The large number of zero entries and a
long tail of large positive prescriptions for some physicians raise the concern that the
distribution of the monthly prescriptions in my data is heavily right skewed, and the
estimation results could be sensitive to the long tail. To address this issue, I perform
two forms of log transformation of the dependent variable: 1) Y = log(Rxibt + 1), and
2) Y = log(Rxibt +
√
Rx2ibt + 1), keeping the zero observations. Form one is a Box-
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Cox transformation frequently used in marketing and biomedical studies. Form two is
a scale invariant Inverse-Hyperbolic-Sinh transformation frequently used in labor and
wealth studies (see MacKinnon and Magee, 1990). Both forms of transformation work
to approximate normality of the residuals with a large number of zero outcomes (e.g.
MacKinnon and Magee, 1990).
2.3.2.1 Robustness Check Using Generalized Synthetic Control Method
In the panel regression, I attempt to control for any differences across the treatment
and control states by (a) focusing on the contiguous border areas and (b) absorbing
the brand-physician differences. Moreover, I control for common time-varying unob-
servables with fixed effects. I further check the sensitivity of the conclusion using three
different drug classes, different pre- and post-periods, and an alternative control state.
However, there could still be concern that the physicians in the treated and control
units may be different in important ways. For example, prior to the policy interven-
tion, physicians in MA, CT, and NY might have followed different temporal trends in
drug prescriptions. Although I find that the pre-treatment trends are comparable in
MA and the control states of CT and NY (please refer to Table 2.4), there were some
discrepancies in the antipsychotics category, especially in the MA-NY border. While
it is hard to find a “perfect clone” from existing states, researchers have proposed con-
structing a “clone” for each unit in the treated group by using a convex combination of
units in the control group. This synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015) is
gaining popularity in marketing studies with quasi-experimental designs (e.g. Tirunil-
lai and Tellis, 2016). The idea behind the method is that the synthetic control unit
will closely represent the unit in the treated state along dimensions that the researcher
deems important. In my case, I construct a “synthetic clone” unit in the control state
that mimics the pre-period prescription trend for each unit in MA. Since my analysis
involves applying the idea of synthetic controls to a large number of treated units (i.e.,
physicians), I use the generalized synthetic control (GSC) method (Xu, 2017).
Intuitively, the generalized synthetic control (GSC) method first projects the treated
units onto the multi-dimensional latent space spanned by the control units such that
they are matched on key characteristics, which, in my case, are their pre-period out-
comes. In this way, the treated units and the control units are made “comparable”
by adjusting the loadings they have on each of the dimensions (factors). Using the
loadings and the latent factors, GSC method obtains the projected post-period out-
comes for treated units if they had not been treated. By comparing the projected
outcomes to the actual values, I can obtain an estimate of the average treatment ef-
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fect. To evaluate the statistical significance of the estimate, GSC method constructs
bootstrapped distribution of the estimate in a way similar to the placebo test in the
traditional synthetic control method. When there is sufficiently long pre-period data
(i.e., T0 > 10), GSC is computationally faster, less sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of a
small number of observations, and produces more interpretable uncertainty estimates
such as the standard errors and confidence intervals (Xu, 2017).
However, GSC, as well as the original synthetic control method, does not perform
well if the outcome is highly discrete and sparse (i.e., with a lot of zeros, which is
likely to be the case when I consider prescriptions at the individual physician level).
Thus, I aggregate the prescription data to the ZIP code level and use zipcodes as my
unit of analysis. Let Rxzt indicate the average monthly new prescriptions written per
physician in zipcode z and month t, (t = 1, 2, 3, ..., 48). I use the following specification:
Rxzt = Dztδz +Xztβ + FtΛz + zt, (2.3)
where the treatment indicator Dzt equals 1 if zipcode z is from Massachusetts and
t is after month 18, and equals 0 otherwise. δz captures the treatment effect for an
average physician in zipcode z that is treated. Xzt includes a constant term and the
number of patients receiving any new prescriptions (beyond the three categories being
considered) from physicians in that zipcode. Recall that the number of patients in
a zipcode accounts for changes in the number of patients enrolled in insurance plans
offered by the data provider over time. Ft = [f1t, ..., frt]
′ consists of r unobserved
orthogonal factors (each have T values, T=48), with Λz = [λz1, ..., λzr]
′ the (r x 1)
unknown factor loadings. Note that the treated and control units are influenced by the
same set of factors. The number of factors, r, is fixed throughout month 1 to 48, while
each zipcode can have a different set of loadings on r factors. In practice, the number
of factors is determined in a data-driven way using cross-validation.
Note that zipcode fixed effects and time fixed effects can be considered as two
special cases of the unobserved factors by setting ft = 1 (for zipcode fixed effects) and
λz = 1 (for time fixed effects). When bringing the model to data, I explicitly impose
it as a model restriction so that I always have the two-way fixed effects. zt is the zero
mean idiosyncratic error for zipcode z and month t. I discuss model estimation and
inference details in appendix A.1.
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2.4 Results
I present the results from my analysis for the three drug classes in Table 2.6. Recall that
I control for the post-treatment main effects and physician-brand specific fixed effects.
The results reveal that the treatment effects are negative and statistically significant
for all three drug classes and across alternative definitions of treatment. This implies
that the prescriptions of branded drugs in the three drug classes declined as a result of
the disclosure law. The results are robust when I control for total number of patients
receiving new prescriptions and renewals from each physician each month, although
the magnitude of the effects is lower by 2%-8%. Moreover, as expected, the sign of the
coefficient for the size of the patient pool is positive. These findings suggest that some
of the change in prescriptions was driven by changes in the size of the patient pool
that a physician treats every month. Specifically, the estimated decline is 48%-59%
for branded statins, 46%-54% for branded antidepressants, and 40%-45% for branded
antipsychotics, after controlling for monthly patient group sizes per physician. The size
of the effect is the lower for treatment 1 (i.e., when the law came into effect) compared
to alternative definitions of treatment that consider later time periods. This suggests
a cumulative impact from the policy intervention over time.
In addition, I find that the prescriptions for generic drugs decreased as a result of
disclosure, although the decline was not as pronounced as in the case of branded drugs.
Specifically, the decline is between 38%-46% for generic statins; 32%-41% for generic
antidepressants; and 38%-40% for generic antipsychotics. The percentage difference
between changes in generics and the branded drugs ranges from 7%-10% in case of
statins, 13%-14% in case of antidepressants, and 2%-5% in case of antipsychotics.
2.4.1 Robustness Checks
Below, I investigate the robustness of my key findings that both branded and generic
prescriptions declined in MA subsequent to the introduction of the disclosure law.
2.4.1.1 Alternative Control State
In order to verify that the results are not idiosyncratic to the choice of CT as the
control state, I replicate the analysis by considering physicians on the MA-NY border.
The idea is that if I obtain similar results with two different control states, they are
unlikely to be driven by an idiosyncratic trend.
I present the results using prescription data from the MA-NY border in Table A.3
17
of Appendix B. These results are smaller, and broadly consistent with those from the
MA-CT border. Specifically, the results from the MA-NY border suggest that the pre-
scriptions of branded drugs in the three therapeutic classes declined as a result of the
policy intervention. Moreover, I find the prescriptions declined by 25%-31% for branded
statins (compared to 48%-59% on MA-CT border), by 31%-42% for branded antide-
pressants (compared to 46%-54% on MA-CT border), and by 34%-42% for branded
antipsychotics (compared to 40%-45% on MA-CT border). However, the decline of
branded antidepressants is only statistically significant for the first treatment in July,
2009, i.e., when the law was passed (Table A.3).
The negative effect on generics is relatively smaller when I consider the MA-NY
border. Specifically, the generic statins decline insignificantly. Nevertheless, the num-
ber of generic prescriptions in the antidepressant and antipsychotic categories declined
in a statistically significant manner. The results in Table A.3 imply that generic antide-
pressants declined by 17.3%-17.6%, much smaller compared to the 32%-41% decline
estimated on MA-CT border. On the other hand, generic antipsychotics declined by
45%-51%, which is slightly larger than those from MA-CT border (38%-40%). Consis-
tent with findings on MA-CT border, the effect from the policy intervention is stronger
for branded drugs than for generics on MA-NY border in two out of three classes, with
the decline gradually increases from treatment 1 to 3. This indicates that physicians
are potentially substituting branded drugs with generics on MA-NY border.
2.4.1.2 Robustness with Generalized Synthetic Control Method
Recall that the premise behind my analysis is that the physicians in the control state
will help in projecting the counterfactual prescriptions that would have been written
by physicians in MA had the disclosure law not been instituted. This is accomplished
by creating a combination of units in the control state (CT or NY) that would match
each unit in the treated state (MA) based on some characteristics. In my application, I
match the control and treated zipcodes based on the average monthly prescriptions per
physician in month 1 to 18 (i.e., the pre-treatment period). This helps me project the
counterfactuals for the treated zipcodes if the treatment had not occurred. I present
the estimated ATE from this analysis in Table 2.7.
Overall, GSC method replicates the significant negative effects found in panel re-
gression (Table 2.7, with bootstrapped standard errors from a placebo test). The only
exception is branded antidepressants on MA-CT border, for which GSC estimation
does not achieve usual significance level. However, the mean estimates are very similar
to the panel regression results. Specifically, the number of new prescriptions and re-
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newals for branded statins declined by 49% - 64% on MA-CT border, and by 33% - 45%
on MA-NY border. The decline for branded antidepressants is between 50%-56% on
MA-CT border, and 47%-54% on MA-NY border. These numbers for branded antipsy-
chotics are between 36%-46% on MA-CT border, and between 40%-50% on MA-NY
border. For generics, GSC estimation uncover significant decline across all three classes
on MA-CT border (34%-59% for statins, 20%-40% for antidepressants, and 52%-75%
for antipsychotics), as well as for statins (26%-30%) and antidepressants (24%-27%)
on MA-NY border. Table 2.8 compares the size of the estimated ATE across the two
estimation methods, by state borders and drug classes. The GSC method generates
relatively larger estimates than panel regression. Again, the results from GSC method
still indicate that branded prescriptions decline more than their generic counterparts
(Table 2.7) for two out of three classes. The size of the decline grows over time across
all three drug classes.
2.4.1.3 Alternative Pre Period
As discussed earlier, in January 2009, Blue Cross Blue Shield introduced Alternative
Quality Contract (AQC) in MA. Although my prescription data correspond to patients
enrolled in plans offered by a different insurance company, I wanted to verify that my
results are not contaminated by AQC. To this end, I check robustness of my findings
using Jan 2009-June 2009 as the pre-period. This would eliminate prescriptions that
were written prior to AQC and would therefore give me the average treatment effect
using data after AQC was introduced. I present the results from this analysis in ap-
pendix A.3. These results suggest that using Jan-Jun 2009 as the new pre-period does
not change the conclusion of the findings, although the estimated ATE are smaller
(Table A.6c). Specifically, prescriptions declined by 43%-54% for branded statins , by
28%-31% for branded antidepressants, and by 21%-27% for branded antipsychotics.
With the new pre-period, the magnitude of decline is between 38%-45% for generic
statins, 28%-38% for generic antidepressants, and 23%-29% for generic antipsychotics.
Thus, branded statins declined by 5%-9% more than generic statins, while the size
of decline is pretty comparable across branded and generics for antidepressants and
antipsychotics. Consistent with my previous results, the effect size of the policy inter-
vention gradually increased over time, indicating a cumulative impact from the policy
intervention. Therefore, the broad results that (a) prescriptions of branded and generic
drugs declined as a result of the disclosure law, (b) branded drugs declined no less than
their generic counterparts, and (c) the effect of the policy intervention becomes stronger
if I consider later time periods do not appear to be an artifact of AQC.
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2.4.1.4 Transformed Dependent Variable
Recall that the large number of zero monthly prescriptions at the individual physician
level raises the concern that the result can be highly sensitive to the long tail of large
positive prescriptions. I perform two forms of log transformation of the dependent
variable: 1) Y = log(Rxibt + 1), and 2) Y = log(Rxibt +
√
Rx2ibt + 1) to address this
issue. I present the results from this analysis in Appendix A.4. The findings from
log-transformations are more robust to outliers and consistent across specifications.
The estimates from the two log transformations are very similar to each other and
are consistent with the key results reported earlier. For the model with transformed
variables, the suggested decline ranges from 38%-49% for branded statins, 31%-40%
for branded antidepressants, and 16%-21% for branded antipsychotics. Generics show
a smaller size of decline than branded in two out of three classes. On average, generic
statins declined by 9% less than branded, and generic antidepressants declined by 12%
less than branded. Generic antipsychotics slightly deviates from this pattern, where
generic antipsychotics declined by 5% more than branded on average. Overall, log-
transforming the dependent variables again show that a) both branded and generic
prescriptions decline after policy intervention, with the magnitude and significance
varying across three drug classes; b) branded prescriptions decline more than generics
for two out of three classes; and c) the effect of the intervention increases over time.
The robust findings across the physician panel regression with alternative control
state, alternative pre-period, generalized synthetic control estimation, as well as the
log-transformed outcome measures, establish the existence of the effect from the policy
intervention, which is both statistically and economically significant.
2.4.2 The Brand Level Impact of Disclosure
I further explore whether there are systematic differences across brands, especially in
terms of their market share. I present the brand-specific estimation results in Tables
2.9a-2.9c. Note that I only report the estimated average treatment effect in percent-
ages and the significance level, but not the regression coefficients. There are two main
findings. First, the effects of policy intervention on the top brands across three drug
classes (Lipitor, Crestor, Lexapro, and Seroquel) are statistically significant and robust
in terms of their magnitude across alternative specifications. However, when I consider
the second, third, and other smaller branded antipsychotics and antidepressants, the
decline is not statistically significant after controlling for the total number of patients.
Second, market leaders show a much larger percentage decline post intervention com-
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pared to their immediate followers and generics. For example, prescriptions for the
top antidepressant, Lexapro, declined by 33%-52%, whereas the second player Cym-
balta experienced a smaller decline of around 25%. Similarly, prescriptions for the top
branded antipsychotics, Seroquel, declined by 38%-43%, which is twice as large as the
decline experienced by the second player, Abilify (19%-24%). Statin brands exhibit
some deviation from this trend. Specifically, the decline of the top 2 statins, Lipi-
tor and Crestor, are nearly equally large. A possible explanation is that Lipitor and
Crestor were equally strong on the market. Note that the top brands (Lipitor, Crestor,
Lexapro, and Seroquel) also show 2%-14% larger decline than their generic counter-
parts. Overall, these findings indicate that the disclosure law impacts the market leader
brands more than the follower brands, as well as generics.
2.4.3 The Role of Physician Heterogeneity
Recall that I classify physicians into three different groups - light, medium, or heavy
- in each of the three drug classes based on the total number of prescriptions written
by them during January 2006-June 2009 i.e., before the policy change.11 I report
the average number of branded and generic prescriptions written by each month by
physicians in the three groups as well as the average number of patients in Table
2.5. In general, light prescribers only write 1 prescription a year for the three drug
classes. Medium prescribers write 1-2 prescriptions in every 10 months, while heavy
prescribers write at least 1 prescription per month. On average, physicians prescribe
less branded statins and antidepressants than their generic counterparts, and prescribe
more branded antipsychotics than generics. The discrepancy between branded and
generic prescriptions is especially large for heavy prescribers: they give twice as much
generic statins as branded statins, 2-6 times more generic antidepressants than branded
antidepressants, and twice as much branded antipsychotics as generic antipsychotics.
Meanwhile, the number of patients visiting heavy prescribers each month doubles the
number visiting light prescribers, and is about 1.5 times the number visiting medium
prescribers.
I check whether the policy has heteogeneous effects on different physician groups
following eq.2.2 (Table 2.10a-2.10c for MA-CT results, Table A.5a-A.5c for MA-NY
results). Due to space limit, I only report the estimated average treatment effect in
percentages instead of regression coefficients. While both heavy and light prescribers
show significant decline in branded statins and in generics of all three classes, only the
11The conclusion does not change if I define groups based on fixed number of prescriptions.
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heavy prescribers show robust significant decline in branded antipsychotics. Among
branded antidepressants, the decline for different physician groups is not robust when
controlling for total monthly patients. Interestingly, for both branded and generic med-
ication, light prescribers show a larger percentage decline than the heavy prescribers,
although the absolute change is bigger for the latter. A possible explanation is that
light prescribers have low average levels of prescriptions (as seen in Table 2.5). There-
fore, a small change in the number of prescriptions will result in a large change in
percentage terms. Comparing the change in branded medication with those for gener-
ics might be more meaningful to evaluate the impact of the policy intervention across
physician groups. Focusing on the difference in the decline between the branded and
generic drugs within the same physician group, the biggest impact is for the heavy
prescribers (on average 12% on MA-CT border, 6% on MA-NY border) compared to
medium prescribers (on average 4% on MA-CT border, 3.6% on MA-NY border) and
light (on average -6% on MA-CT border, -5.7% on MA-NY border). This indicates
that the policy intervention led to greater decline in branded prescriptions compared
to generics. This suggests that the legislation is somewhat effective in shifting heavy
prescribers from branded to generics drugs.
2.4.4 Relationship between Changes in Prescription and Firm
Payments
As discussed earlier in the paper, one of the rationales behind the disclosure law was
that it would either discourage firms from making payments to physicians or render it
unattractive for physicians to accept them. The resulting decrease in payments might
reduce the number of branded prescriptions in favor of generic equivalents. Therefore,
from a policy-maker point of view, it might be interesting to understand if the decline
in branded prescriptions is in some way tied to changes in payments.
Across the various analyses discussed above, I consistently find that generic pre-
scriptions declined after the policy intervention. Since manufacturers of generic drugs
do not typically make payments to physicians, this result suggests that the change in
prescription behavior documented above is unlikely to be solely a result of changes in
payment structure as a result of the legislation. To further investigate this, I marry
the prescription data with the payment data made available in MA as a result of
the disclosure law. I use the physician payment data from Massachusetts Health and
Human Services for the period July 2009-Dec 2011. These data are available at the
firm-physician-year level. Specifically, each record includes the names and location
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information for both the firm and the payee, the payee’s state license type (e.g. physi-
cian, nurse, pharmacist) and license number, the payment amount in dollars, and the
nature of the payment (e.g. food, meeting, training, grants, etc.). During 2009-2011,
68% of the payments in the data are directed at 10,918 physicians from 363 manu-
facturers. Of these payments, the largest proportion is for meals (44%), followed by
compensation for Bona Fide services12 (26.7%), grants/educational gifts (13.8%), and
education/training (10.8%). The remaining 5% are for other purposes including meet-
ings, continuing medical education (CME), marketing studies and charitable donations.
In terms of the dollar amount, 87.9% ($66 million) was on account of compensation
for Bona Fide services, 4.5% goes to education/training, 3% to food and the remaining
4.5% to other purposes.
However, given that the identity of physicians is masked in the prescription data,
I cannot match individual physicians with payments that they receive. Therefore, I
aggregate prescriptions to the ZIP code level and consider the total payments paid per
physician in that ZIP code to create a measure of per-capita payments. An additional
limitation of these data is that I only observe payments subsequent to the law. There-
fore, I do not observe how and to what extent payments changed as a result of the
disclosure law.
In view of these data limitations, my empirical strategy is to exploit the cross-
sectional variation in payments in each Massachusetts zipcode in the disclosed data
and test whether the level of prescription decline is associated with how much the
local area is paid in general. The rationale is that, should firms cut down payments
after the legislation or physicians become more reluctant to accept them, the resulting
decline in payment would be larger in zipcodes that receive larger payments. Thus,
if the decline in prescriptions that I observe is due to change in payments after the
legislation, I expect to see such decline to be the largest among the most heavily paid
zipcodes. The cross-sectional nature of my analysis cannot pinpoint the (causal) impact
of payments directly. Nevertheless, by examining the relationship between payments
and branded prescription post treatment (equation 2.4), I expect to collect suggestive
evidence that sheds light on one potential mediator of the impact from mandated
disclosure on prescriptions.
Since the payment data do not include variation across different products from the
same firm, I take all payments from a firm as the proxy for the dollar influence over
12Bona Fide services include but are not limited to consulting and participation in speaker’s bureaus,
joint research projects, clinical trials, and advising on disease treatments. See Kesselheim et al.,
2013, and Forbes report: http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2013/06/11/nejm-sheds-light-
on-payments-to-doctors/#6e8891f46c49.
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each single brand under study. Payments for Connecticut physicians and for generic
drugs are set to zero. I divide the zipcode-level payments by total number of physicians
from the zipcode in the prescription data to obtain a proxy for payment per capita (in
000s): PayPerCapitafz =
∑2011
y=2009 AnnualPayment
f
y
1000∗∑i 1(i∈z) . The mean payment per capita-brand
is highest for statins ($56), followed by antipsychotics ($47), and antidepressants ($26)
(Table 2.3).
I investigate the direct relationship between firm payments and changes in prescrip-
tions of each brand with the following specification:
Rxibt = αbIbIsIt + δbIbIsIt ∗ PayPerCapitaf |b∈fz + λbt + Iib +Xitβ + ict (2.4)
For brands other than the top 3, I lump payments from all other firms together and
consider it as a shifter for all small brands. Note that the main effect of PayPerCapitafz
is absorbed by brand-physician fixed effects (Iib). A negative δb suggests that prescrip-
tions of brand b declines more when b is more heavily marketed through physician
payments, on top of the average decline of brand b across all zipcodes. As can be seen
from Table 2.11-2.13, on top of the decline that occurred for all Massachusetts physi-
cians after the disclosure intervention, the additional influence from firm payments is
statistically indistinguishable from zero. This result is consistent for all brands across
the three drug classes, with Cymbalta (top 2 brand in antidepressants) being the only
exception. The insignificance could be due to the data limitation, as I do not have
access to physician-brand level payment data and instead use aggregates at zipcode
and firm level. On the other hand, the lack of support for the direct relationship be-
tween the decline in branded prescriptions and the level of firm payments for branded
drugs seems to echo the implication from the decline of generic prescriptions. That is,
both suggest that the change in prescription behavior is unlikely to be solely related
to changes in payment structure as a result of the legislation.
2.4.5 Discussion
The pattern of my results clearly suggests the following. First, disclosure changes pre-
scription behavior. Specifically it lowers prescriptions for branded and generic drugs.
This finding is robust across different estimation models, different drug classes, differ-
ent control groups, and to different specifications.13 I therefore rule out that a firm-side
change in payments post disclosure caused this outcome as, in that case, I should have
13For a full set of robustness checks, see table A.1 and the appendix.
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seen no change in generic prescriptions. Second, the impact of the disclosure is higher
on branded drugs (relative to generics) and within branded drugs, higher on the larger
brands. Third, the policy is more effective in shifting heavier prescribers from branded
to generics. Finally, using post disclosure payments data, I am unable to find a sta-
tistically significant relationship between payments and prescriptions (at the zipcode
level). The explanation that is most consistent with these findings is that physicians in-
crease self-monitoring, leading to lower overall prescriptions. This is also reinforced by
the second and third findings described above. As pharmaceutical companies typically
allocate marketing resources based on prescription volume (Manchanda and Chinta-
gunta, 2004), the extent of self-monitoring is likely to be the most for branded drugs
among the heaviest prescribers.
Another noteworthy aspect of my results is that the extent of decline seems to be
economically “big.” I investigate this by replicating my results using border counties
along the border with another state (New York) as the control group (details are in
Appendix A.2). I replicate my results and find the drop in branded statins to be
28% on average (55% in CT), branded antidepressants to be 42% (51% in CT) and
branded antipsychotics to be 39% (42% in CT). In a similar vein, the drop in generic
statins is 6% on average (43% in CT), generic antidepressants to be 18% (38% in CT)
and generic antipsychotics to be 48% (39% in CT). In fact, my results are of similar
magnitude to those reported in King and Bearman, 2013’s, where the prescriptions of
four newly marketed mental health medications drop by 39% to 83% in states that
prohibit pharmaceutical gifts to doctors. Thus, the effect sizes I find do not seem to
be idiosyncratic to my initial choice of control (state).
The decline in prescriptions could be due to two reasons - higher “under-
prescription” or lower “over-diagnosis.” In the former, physicians are reluctant to
conclude that the patient’s condition warrants medication (e.g., they may advocate
weight loss, dietary control and lifestyle change rather than a statin to prevent car-
diovascular disease14 while in the latter, physicians may overestimate the need for
medication in order to err on the safe side. Given that under-prescribing can lead to
worse health outcomes (see Carey et al., 2015), the welfare implications of my results
is not clear.
14See, for example, Stampfer et al., 2000 and Hu et al., 2001
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2.5 Conclusion
This essay adds to the growing literature on the impact of mandated transparency
on healthcare, with specific focus on how marketing regulations influence physician
behavior. Specifically, using very high quality behavioral data and a rich set of controls,
this essay provides evidence that disclosure laws impact physician prescription behavior
in both a statistically and economically significant manner. The results show that,
across a series of policy interventions in Massachusetts from 2009 to 2011, the number
of prescriptions of both branded and generic drugs drops with the relative magnitude
of the drop being higher for branded drugs. The pattern of the results suggests that
the main reason for the change in behavior is self-monitoring by physicians rather than
a change in the direct payment regime on the firm side. I show the robustness of my
results using prescriptions in three different drug classes across three temporal change
points representing the policy intervention, via the use of a different estimation method,
the use of an alternative control group, the use of a different pre-period (January 1, 2009
to June 30, 2009) as well as different data transformations. The full set of robustness
checks is summarized in TableA.1, with the results presented in Appendix A.2-A.4.
Across all these checks, my overall finding is that there is negative and significant
impact on prescriptions as a result of the introduction of the disclosure law.
My establishing what happened and (perhaps) why it happened as a result of the
disclosure law opens up multiple avenues for future research. The first avenue deals
with the physician behavior - self-monitoring - that I suggest is at play here. Will
self-monitoring (and the consequent drop in prescriptions) remain an important force
over the long-term, especially once the disclosure of payment information becomes the
norm for all physicians across the nation? Is it possible to manage both over-diagnosis
and under-prescription, especially as there are some concerns about the potential ef-
ficacy decline of drugs prescribed by physicians under disclosure (Carey et al., 2015)?
The second avenue is focused around firm and patient response to public payment in-
formation. Will firms respond strategically to the revealed payment information from
rivals? Will patients examine the payments data and if they do, will that affect their
healthcare decisions? Finally, what are the implications for social welfare for creat-
ing and implementing these laws? Many of these payments are made to physicians
in recognition of their involvement in the innovation process, such as industry-driven
research, that brings new treatment options to the market. Could the public disclo-
sure of physician payment hinder physician participation in bringing new treatment
options to market (e.g., prescribing drugs that are in the clinical trial phase)? This
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can be detrimental to advancement in treatment options that are available to patients
in the future (Santhakumar and Adashi, 2015). Moreover, it is unclear whether the
potential savings in healthcare costs (from reduced prescriptions) justify the expendi-
ture throughout the process of data collection, preparation, interpretation and public
dissemination.
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Figure 2.1: MA-CT border counties in the regression sample.
Litcheld, Hartford, Tolland, Windham (CT); Hampden, Berkshire and Worcester
(MA).Berkshire and Worcester zipcodes are included up to the northern border of
Hampden (lat <42.4N).
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Figure 2.2: Average monthly prescriptions per physician, by class and state.
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Table 2.2: Number of physicians, drugs, and brand-name drugs in the sample.
#physicians #drugs§ #brandnames #zips
MA CT MA CT MA CT MA CT
Statins 1,014 1,326 13 16 9 11 100 95
Antidepressants 1,322 1,752 42 57 14 22 102 103
Antipsychotics 393 703 29 34 15 19 81 90
§A drug is uniquely defined by its trademark name or generic name.
Table 2.3: Physician panel summary statistics, January 2008 - December 2011.
(a) Statins.
Variable N Mean sd Max
Branded Rx, per physician-month
MA 48,672 0.09 0.39 12
CT 63,648 0.19 0.59 12
Generic Rx, per physician-month
MA 48,672 0.16 0.53 18
CT 63,648 0.25 0.88 24
Total patients, per physician-month
MA 48,672 4 9 118
CT 63,648 5 13 323¶
Payment per capita ($), per physician-brand§ MA 4,056 56.04 210.15 2,159.91
(b) Antidepressants.
Variable N Mean sd Max
Branded Rx, per physician-month
MA 63,456 0.03 0.24 10
CT 84,096 0.11 0.54 16
Generic Rx, per physician-month
MA 63,456 0.28 1.07 38
CT 84,096 0.33 1.29 39
Total patients, per physician-month
MA 63,456 4 12 376¶
CT 84,096 5 11 256
Payment per capita ($), per physician-brand MA 7,932 26.09 121.68 1,427.89
(c) Antipsychotics.
Variable N Mean sd Max
Branded Rx, per physician-month
MA 18,864 0.18 0.79 27
CT 33,744 0.22 0.86 18
Generic Rx, per physician-month
MA 18,864 0.09 0.46 14
CT 33,744 0.13 0.65 28
Total patients, per physician-month
MA 18,864 4 10 161
CT 33,744 4 8 170¶
Payment per capita ($), per physician-brand§ MA 1,965 47.45 187.26 1,622.03
§Brands other than the top 3 (top 2 for statins) are lumped together. Generics are ex-
cluded. ¶ In 2008, a physician sees 23 patients per day on average. This translates into
460 patients in 1 month (4 weeks, 5day/week). Source: The Physicians Foundation.
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Table 2.4: Average monthly growth rate in total prescriptions during Jan 2008 - June
2009, in the border samples.
Border State Statins Antidepressants Antipsychotics
MA-CT
MA 3.34% 2.89% 1.44%
CT 4.24% 4.26% 5.61%
MA-NY
MA 6.86% 7.44% 5.18%
NY 6.47% 6.39% 12.61%
Table 2.5: Average prescription level and monthly patients by physician group,
Jan2008-Dec2011.
(a) Statins.
CT MA
Average per physician-month Light Medium Heavy Light Medium Heavy
Branded Rx 0.05 0.18 0.61 0.03 0.08 0.29
Generic Rx 0.07 0.21 0.84 0.05 0.14 0.49
Total patients 4 7 9 3 5 7
(b) Antidepressants.
CT MA
Average per physician-month Light Medium Heavy Light Medium Heavy
Branded Rx 0.02 0.08 0.40 0.01 0.02 0.12
Generic Rx 0.08 0.24 1.21 0.08 0.21 0.96
Total patients 4 5 7 3 4 6
(c) Antipsychotics.
CT MA
Average per physician-month Light Medium Heavy Light Medium Heavy
Branded Rx 0.07 0.17 0.89 0.05 0.13 0.68
Generic Rx 0.03 0.10 0.53 0.02 0.05 0.33
Total patients 4 5 7 3 2 8
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Table 2.6: Panel Regression Results.
(a) Statins.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.104*** -0.078*** -0.143*** -0.107*** -0.166*** -0.123***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.135*** -0.109*** -0.190*** -0.154*** -0.221*** -0.177***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023)
Monthly total patients 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -56% -48.6% -63.8% -56.8% -66.3% -59.3%
ATE%, generics -43.2% -38% -49.6% -44.3% -51.4% -46%
N 224,640 224,640 168,480 168,480 149,760 149,760
(b) Antidepressants.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.037*** -0.027*** -0.048*** -0.033*** -0.054*** -0.037***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.143*** -0.132*** -0.201*** -0.187*** -0.222*** -0.204***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031)
Monthly total patients 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -54.5% -46.5% -60.8% -51.9% -62.9% -53.6%
ATE%, generics -33.6% -31.9% -41.6% -39.8% -43.1% -41.2%
N 295,104 295,104 221,328 221,328 196,736 196,736
(c) Antipsychotics.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.121*** -0.100** -0.143*** -0.113** -0.138*** -0.104**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.048) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.074*** -0.053** -0.089*** -0.059** -0.093*** -0.058**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Monthly total patients 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -44.6% -40% -50.5% -44.6% -48.5% -41.4%
ATE%, generics -46.5% -38.3% -49.7% -39.5% -50.1% -38.8%
R-squared 0.006 0.03 0.008 0.03 0.008 0.03
N 105,216 105,216 78,912 78,912 70,144 70,144
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (Nov 22, 2010).
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Table 2.7: Average Treatment Effect as percentage change of post counterfactuals,
using Generalized Synthetic Control method.
MA-CT border MA-NY border
Statins Antidep. Antipsych. Statins Antidep. Antipsych.
Branded Rx per physician/zip
Post 1 -48.8%*** -49.7% -35.6%*** -33.3%* -52.1%* -39.8%*
Post 2 -59.9%*** -55.8% -45.8%*** -36.9% -54.3% -49.5%**
Post 3 -63.9%*** -54.1% -44.6%*** -44.8%* -46.9% -50.2%*
Generic Rx per physician/zip
Post 1 -50.3%*** -24.3%*** -66.2%* -30.5%** -26.8%*** -68.5%
Post 2 -58.8%*** -40.1%*** -74.6%* -28.6%** -24.0%** -67.7%
Post 3 -34.7%*** -20.2%*** -51.9%* -25.6%** -26.0%*** -56.2%
Nzip, control 95 103 90 62 67 47
Nzip, treat 100 102 81 76 76 49
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard errors are from a placebo test and are bootstrapped for
1,000 times. Monthly patients control and two-way fixed effects included. ATE% evaluated at the
mean counterfactual.
Table 2.8: Comparison of estimated decline from Panel Regression and Generalized
Synthetic Control.
Statins Antidep. Antipsych.
MA-CT border
Branded Rx
Panel Reg. 48.6%-59.3% 46.5%-53.6% 40%-45%
GSC 48.8%-64.0% 49.7%-55.8% 35.6%-45.8%
Generic Rx
Panel Reg. 38%-46% 32%-41% 38%-39%
GSC 34.7%-58.8% 20.2%-40.1% 51.9%-74.6%
MA-NY border
Branded Rx
Panel Reg. 25%-31.5% 30.9%-42.2% 33.9%-42.1%
GSC 33.3%-44.8% 46.9%-54.3% 39.8%-50.2%
Generic Rx
Panel Reg. 3.5%-8.6% 17.3%-17.6% 44.9%-51.5%
GSC 25.6%-30.5% 24.0%-26.8% 56.2%-68.5%
Monthly patients control and two-way fixed effects included in both methods.
ATE% evaluated at the mean counterfactual.
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Table 2.9: Brand-Specific Effects.
(a) Statins.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Top 1 (Lipitor) -53.3%*** -48.1%*** -61.7%*** -56.5%*** -64.8%*** -59.7%***
ATE, Top 2 (Crestor) -63.4%*** -51.2%*** -69.4%*** -58.5%*** -70.3%*** -58.9%***
ATE, Generic Rx -43.2%*** -38%*** -49.6%*** -44.3%*** -51.4%*** -46%***
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 449,280 449,280 336,960 336,960 299,520 299,520
(b) Antidepressants.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Top 1 (Lexapro) -44.3%*** -32.8%** -59.1%*** -46.5%*** -66.0%*** -51.7%***
ATE, Top 2 (Cymbalta) -39.0%*** -24.7%** -41.2%*** -23.8% -43.3%*** -23.7%
ATE, Top 3 (Pristiq) -71.3%*** 7.4% -71.1%*** 21.4% -65.9%*** 27.6%
ATE, Generic Rx -32.3%*** -31.5%*** -40.0%*** -39.2%*** -42.0%*** -41.1%***
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 737,760 737,760 553,320 553,320 491,840 491,840
(c) Antipsychotics.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Top 1 (Seroquel) -44.3%*** -40.7%** -47.5%*** -42.7%** -43.5%** -37.6%*
ATE, Top 2 (Abilify) -34.8%* -22.8% -40.1%** -24.1% -37.6%* -18.9%
ATE, Top 3 (Zyprexa) -39.5%* -28.8% -50.0%** -36.5% -49.7%* -33.8%
ATE, Generic Rx -46.5%*** -38.3%*** -49.7%*** -39.5%*** -50.1%*** -38.8%***
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 263,040 263,040 197,280 197,280 175,360 175,360
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean.§Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (November 22, 2010).
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Table 2.10: Heterogeneous effects across physician groups.
(a) Statins.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx, Light -67.0%*** -35.7%** -74.1%*** -45.4%** -80.5%*** -51.1%***
ATE, Branded Rx, Medium -51.0%*** -25.7%** -61.4%*** -38.8%*** -66.8%*** -42.8%***
ATE, Branded Rx, Heavy -45.9%*** -36.4%*** -53.3%*** -42.6%*** -54.9%*** -43.3%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Light -66.0%*** -63.8%*** -71.8%*** -69.6%*** -78.0%*** -75.3%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Medium -48.5%*** -44.9%*** -52.5%*** -49.4%*** -56.5%*** -53.3%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Heavy -30.3%*** -28.0%*** -37.6%*** -35.1%*** -38.0%*** -35.3%***
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 291,264 291,264 218,448 218,448 194,176 194,176
(b) Antidepressants.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx, Light -63.2%*** 40.1% -69.7%*** 55.0% -75.9%*** 60.8%
ATE, Branded Rx, Medium -52.6%*** 13.7% -61.0%*** 22.9% -63.0%*** 28.3%
ATE, Branded Rx, Heavy -41.2%*** -15.0% -47.2%*** -15.6% -49.1%*** -15.1%
ATE, Generic Rx, Light -58.9%*** -56.5%*** -65.2%*** -63.3%*** -67.5%*** -65.4%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Medium -35.0%*** -33.0%*** -41.4%*** -39.2%*** -43.9%*** -41.7%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Heavy -31.6%*** -31.0%*** -38.8%*** -38.0%*** -39.4%*** -38.6%***
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 582,912 582,912 437,184 437,184 388,608 388,608
(c) Antipsychotics.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx, Light -38.2% 27.5% -37.9% 58.6% -33.7% 82.7%
ATE, Branded Rx, Medium -33.0%* -7.9% -48.6%** -13.5% -46.2%* -1.2%
ATE, Branded Rx, Heavy -52.9%*** -47.1%** -54.5%*** -48.1%** -52.2%*** -45.5%**
ATE, Generic Rx, Light -65.4%*** -60.5%*** -62.9%*** -56.7%** -62.3%*** -55.6%**
ATE, Generic Rx, Medium -51.3%*** -47.8%*** -56.6%*** -52.3%*** -58.3%*** -53.7%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Heavy -41.9%** -39.8%** -42.9%*** -40.5%** -41.9%*** -39.5%**
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 209,328 209,328 156,996 156,996 139,552 139,552
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (November 22, 2010).
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Table 2.11: Relationship between firm payments and statin prescriptions.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
Top 1 brand -0.069*** -0.056*** -0.094*** -0.076*** -0.111*** -0.089***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Top 1 x paypercapita(000s) -0.050 -0.041 -0.035 -0.028 -0.023 -0.017
(0.058) (0.057) (0.067) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064)
Top 2 brand -0.033*** -0.020*** -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.054*** -0.032***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Top 2 x paypercapita(000s) -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
other brands -0.0002 -0.013*** 0.0003 0.019*** -0.00004 0.022***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
others x paypercapita(000s) -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Total generics Rx -0.135*** -0.122*** -0.190*** -0.172*** -0.221*** -0.199***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024)
Monthly total patients 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 449,280 449,280 336,960 336,960 299,520 299,520
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (November 22, 2010).
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Table 2.12: Relationship between firm payments and antidepressant prescriptions.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
Top 1 brand -0.017*** -0.013** -0.027*** -0.021*** -0.032*** -0.025***
(0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.008)
Top 1 x paypercapita(000s) 0.010 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.0076 0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
Top 2 brand -0.011*** -0.0078* -0.013** -0.0073 -0.014** -0.006
(0.004) (0.0044) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0062)
Top 2 x paypercapita(000s) -0.0693* -0.053 -0.076** -0.062* -0.074** -0.062*
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Top 3 brand -0.0031*** 0.00079 -0.0031*** 0.0027 -0.0026*** 0.0042
(0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.00095) (0.00312)
Top 3 x paypercapita(000s) 0.0071 0.055 0.017 0.057 0.013 0.052
(0.014) (0.049) (0.022) (0.060) (0.022) (0.062)
other brands -0.0041** -0.00012 -0.0043** 0.0016 -0.0046** 0.0023
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0036)
others x paypercapita(000s) 0.0013 0.0020 0.0015 0.0019 0.0015 0.0018
(0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0041)
Total generics Rx -0.143*** -0.139*** -0.201*** -0.196*** -0.222*** -0.215***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032)
Monthly total patients 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0049***
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.001)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 737,760 737,760 553,320 553,320 491,840 491,840
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (November 22, 2010).
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Table 2.13: Relationship between firm payments and antipsychotic prescriptions.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
Top 1 brand -0.0550** -0.0474** -0.0623*** -0.0510** -0.0557** -0.0425*
(0.0226) (0.0215) (0.0240) (0.0228) (0.0251) (0.0239)
Top 1 x paypercapita(000s) -0.0424 -0.0306 -0.0249 -0.0158 -0.0311 -0.0246
(0.0616) (0.0587) (0.0682) (0.0655) (0.0557) (0.0528)
Top 2 Brand -0.0168* -0.00851 -0.0205** -0.00860 -0.0200* -0.00642
(0.00942) (0.00938) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Top 2 x paypercapita(000s) -0.0267 -0.0219 -0.0226 -0.0202 -0.0221 -0.0201
(0.0203) (0.0182) (0.0210) (0.0184) (0.0215) (0.0184)
Top 3 brand -0.0209* -0.0138 -0.0279** -0.0170 -0.0286** -0.0158
(0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0144)
Top 3 x paypercapita(000s) -0.00149 0.0585 0.0643 0.113 0.101 0.140
(0.207) (0.187) (0.232) (0.214) (0.246) (0.228)
other brands -0.0213** -0.0138 -0.0274** -0.0162 -0.0293** -0.0163
(0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0130)
others x paypercapita(000s) -0.0297 -0.0201 -0.0315 -0.0235 -0.0325 -0.0260
(0.0420) (0.0384) (0.0429) (0.0398) (0.0431) (0.0404)
Total generics Rx -0.0739*** -0.0654*** -0.0888*** -0.0767*** -0.0925*** -0.0789***
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0238) (0.0233) (0.0248) (0.0244)
Monthly total patients 0.00685*** 0.00641*** 0.00615***
(0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00171)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 263,040 263,040 197,280 197,280 175,360 175,360
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (November 22, 2010).
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CHAPTER 3
The Effect of Information Disclosure on
Industry Payments to Physicians
3.1 Introduction
U.S. pharmaceutical companies devote a significant amount of resources towards per-
suading physicians to prescribe their drugs (Manchanda and Honka, 2013, Manchanda
and Chintagunta, 2004). A sizable fraction of this marketing budget is in the form
of direct payments and gifts such as consulting and speaker fees, conference travel,
and meals. In 2015, these direct payments totaled $2.6 billion, raising concerns that
such practice can bias treatment decisions (DeJong et al., 2016, Grochowski Jones and
Ornstein, 2016, Carey et al., 2015, Engelberg et al., 2014) and lead to higher health-
care costs. As a result, several states have instituted disclosure laws wherein firms are
required to publicly declare the payments that they made to physicians (Chimonas
et al., 2010).1 In 2013, this law was rolled out to all 50 states as part of the Affordable
Care Act.
The motivation behind these disclosure regulations is that patients and payers (in-
surance companies and the government) would make negative inferences about physi-
cians and pharmaceutical firms once they understood the extent of the financial rela-
tionship between them (Pham-Kanter, 2014, Pham-Kanter et al., 2012, Perry et al.,
2014, Agrawal et al., 2013, Carey et al., 2015, Mojir, 2017). This, in turn, might render
physicians reluctant to accept payments (Chen et al., 2016) and firms less willing to
offer them, leading to a decline in such transactions. However, a consequence of public
disclosure is that, in addition to patients and payers, physicians and rival firms can
observe which physicians are being targeted by which firms and also learn about the
1In similar vein, Sudhir and Talukdar, 2015 discuss how transparency as a result of IT adoption
can result in lower corruption in emerging economies
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amount of marketing expenditure directed towards each physician. As a result, the
effect of disclosure of financial ties on subsequent payments is not clear.
In this paper, I investigate the impact of public disclosure of payment information
on subsequent payments. Furthermore, I attempt to parse out the plausible mechanism
driving such changes in payments as a result of public disclosure. In order to achieve
my research objectives, I study the federal regulatory change instituted in 2013 as part
of the Sunshine provision of the Affordable Care Act. The law requires full disclosure
of direct-to-physician payments from every pharmaceutical firm in the United States
(Physician Open Payment Data from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
henceforth CMS). As a result of this law, firms began collecting the payment data
starting in August 2013. These data are at a very granular level and contain information
on the dollar value of the gift/payment at the physician-drug level as well as the date
of the corresponding payment. Firms were required to submit all the data from 2013
to the CMS by March 31, 2014. Physicians and teaching hospitals then had 60 days
to review and dispute the payment information related to themselves before the data
were made public.2 In September 2014, the first batch of payment data from 2013 were
made public via an online portal. Subsequent releases of the payment data happened
on June 30 of every following year.
Due to the review process, any physician-side and firm-side concerns regarding
reputation should be reflected in the payments before data disclosure.3 Therefore,
starting in October 2014, the change in payments made by firms should be a result
of (a) possible reactions from patients and payers upon seeing the disclosed payment
information, (b) comparison of payments on the physician side, and (c) pharmaceutical
firms gaining access to information on the physicians that their rivals target. My study
tracks the payment data until December 2015. Thus, I can compare the payments for
the 14-month period before the first-time disclosure (Aug 2013 - Sep 2014) to those
in the 15 months after (Oct 2014 - Dec 2015) to understand how payments changed
subsequent to public disclosure.
A potential concern with such a comparison is that payment changes over time could
have been driven by other unobservables that are unrelated to disclosure. To control
for the baseline time trends that are not explained by the information disclosure, I
exploit the fact that certain states (MA, VT, MN) had similar state-level disclosure
laws in effect prior to the federal regulation.4 Therefore, the federal disclosure did not
2https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Downloads/Open-Payments-User-Guide.pdf
3As I discuss subsequently, I study the effect of disclosure and the enactment of the law per se.
4These state disclosure laws were generally more stringent than the federal regulation. For example,
in Massachusetts, companies must report payments to anyone “who prescribes, dispenses or purchases
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provide any additional information to the stakeholders in these states. This variation in
the level of information gain from disclosure across states creates a quasi-experimental
setting wherein I can compare the observed payment changes pre- and post-disclosure in
other states to the corresponding payment changes in these states with prior disclosure
laws. This comparison will enable me to understand the causal effect of disclosing
competitors’ direct-to-physician payment information.
The validity of such a difference-in-differences design hinges on the comparability of
physician-drug pairs from the treated and control states (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2014).
In essence, I need to find the best control counterpart, a “clone”, for every physician-
drug pair in the treated states. The conventional approach is to employ propensity
score matching (PSM; Hirano et al., 2003, Imbens and Rubin, 2015), in order to balance
the control and treated units. This involves modeling the propensity of a unit to be
treated using kernel or series estimation with first-order terms and interactions of
selected observed characteristics. Such an approach can become very cumbersome as
the number of covariates increases, especially when (a) higher-order interactions are
also considered and (b) researchers are unwilling to impose any prior assumptions in
covariate selection. Although several revisions to the conventional method have been
proposed (e.g. McCaffrey et al., 2004), they have been found to be sensitive to the
exact implementation (e.g. Khwaja et al., 2011, Athey and Imbens, 2017).
In this paper, I achieve better matching through a machine learning algorithm,
Causal Forest (CF; see Wager and Athey, 2017), that is computationally efficient,
robust to model mis-specification, and offers consistent and asymptotically normal
point estimates for each drug-physician pair. Forest-based models (Breiman, 2001) are
some of the most popular supervised machine learning methods in computer science
and engineering, known for reliable “out-of-the-box” performance without much model
tuning (Athey and Imbens, 2017). While mostly used for prediction tasks (e.g. Berk,
2012; also see Dzyabura and Yoganarasimhan, 2018 for a review of the methods), these
methods have recently been adapted to allow for causal inference (Athey and Imbens,
2016, Wager and Athey, 2017, Ascarza, 2016, Wang et al., 2015). CF is especially
powerful in solving the curse of dimensionality problem in PSM, while letting the data
choose the most relevant features in matching.
prescription drugs or medical devices in the Commonwealth”. These include individuals such as
pharmacist, nurse practitioner, audiologist, podiatrist or physical therapist, as well as facilities such
as nursing home, clinic, hospice program, clinical laboratory, home health agency or pharmacy. These
individuals and facilities are not required to report based on federal law. In practice, the more stringent
one applies where the two laws overlap. See http://www.mass.gov/dph/pharmamed. Therefore, I
argue that the federal law did not provide any new information in these three states that had prior
laws.
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Intuitively, CF clusters the most similar observations into the same group adap-
tively: the group is larger along the directions with higher degree of homogeneity and
smaller along directions with higher degree of heterogeneity. All observations within
the same group are considered to have the same propensity to be treated. This adaptive
nature of CF can substantially increase the clustering accuracy and robustness when
dealing with large space of covariates. I also include the full sequence of pre-disclosure
outcomes as an additional set of features in matching, which further helps me control
for differential pre-trends across control and treatment units in the spirit of synthetic
control methods (e.g. Tirunillai and Tellis, 2016). Additionally, as CF is the bagging
of thousands of trees, each of which takes a subsample of the data and covariates, I can
recover both a point estimate and a confidence interval for each treated unit. This al-
lows me to make inferences about the magnitude and the significance of the treatment
effect for each drug-physician pair. Inferring the heterogeneous treatment effects at
such a granular level would enable me to investigate the likely impact of the disclosure
law as well as the potential mechanism driving the impact of payment disclosure.
My empirical analysis is based on payments made by pharmaceutical firms to physi-
cians in the anti-diabetics category. My data include over $100 million in monthly
payments for 16 branded anti-diabetics to 50,000 physicians between August 2013 and
December 2015. I chose the anti-diabetics category because it is one of the fastest-
growing categories in the pharmaceutical industry, receiving top investments in R&D
and marketing. As a result, new medications are constantly introduced, thereby adding
to competitive intensity. The dynamics of this market makes it a good test field to
study the effect of payment information disclosure among competitors on subsequent
payments between firms and physicians.
My results reveal that the monthly payments declined by 2%, on average, due
to disclosure. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the treatment effects
with 14% of the drug-physician pairs showing a significant increase in their monthly
payment. Hence, while payments did decrease subsequent to disclosure as policy makers
intended, it would be more effective if the decrease is more pronounced for (a) more
expensive drugs, (b) drugs that have a history of making larger payments, and (c)
physicians that tend to prescribe more drugs. The idea is that if payments lead to
biased treatments that can drive up healthcare costs, greater reduction among these
subclasses of drugs and physicians would magnify the positive impact of disclosure.
However, my results suggest that the decline in payments as a result of disclosure
is lower for more expensive drugs and for drugs that were paying more prior to the
disclosure. Moreover, the decline in payment is smaller among physicians who were
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paid more heavily pre-disclosure. Interestingly, these physicians with smaller treatment
effects (and larger pre-treatment payments) also tend to be heavier prescribers. Thus,
while information disclosure did lead to reduction in payments on average (as intended
by policy makers), the effect is muted for heavy prescribers.
As noted earlier, the ideal scenario envisioned by the policy makers was that public
disclosure of payments would result in increased scrutiny from patients and payers,
thereby resulting in a reduction in payments (Pham-Kanter, 2014). However, this
mechanism cannot explain the increase in payments among 14% of drug-physician
pairs in my sample. Furthermore, if public scrutiny results in differential impact across
drugs and physicians, I should expect greater reduction in payments among more
expensive drugs and physicians that receive more payments. However, my results
are not consistent with this either. Therefore, I argue that increased scrutiny from
patients and payers is unlikely to have been the main driver of the effect of disclosure.
The second mechanism wherein physicians have increased ability to compare payments
received by their peers from the same drug should have resulted in overall decrease
in disparity in payments made by a drug across physicians (see the discussion on
CEO compensation disclosure in Gipper 2016). Furthermore, I find that the disparity
in payments made by the same drug to different physicians operating in a market
increased after disclosure. Together, these results do not support the second mechanism
of physicians seeking payment parity subsequent to disclosure.
My third plausible mechanism is related to firms responding to information about
the marketing efforts of their rivals. In this regard, I find that within-physician payment
disparity across brands increases by 4% as a result of the information disclosure, with
the low-pay brands reducing payments more than the high-pay brands. This pattern is
consistent with the idea that firms respond to information about competitive payments
by trying to differentiate themselves, further investigation is needed to pin down the
reasons leading to this change.
My essay takes the first step towards shedding light on the role of public disclosure
in alleviating conflict-of-interest in the pharmaceutical industry, especially in reducing
payments made by pharmaceutical firms to physicians. While public disclosure of
payment information led to a reduction in overall payments, the effect is muted for
highly paid physicians, who also tend to be heavier prescribers. If these physicians are
the intended targets of the disclosure policy, regulators may need to re-evaluate whether
the benefit from the intervention justifies its costs. This essay also contributes to
understanding the consequences of information disclosure about competitor strategies
in other settings. As Federal Trade Commission is pushing for sponsorship disclosure
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for digital content (e.g. Sahni and Nair, 2016, Aribarg and Schwartz, 2017, Edelman
and Gilchrist, 2012) in social influencer/Key Opinion Leader (KOL) marketing (e.g.
among fashion bloggers and TV celebrities; see Hwang and Jeong, 2016, Boerman et al.,
2017, Carr and Hayes, 2014, Dekker and van Reijmersdal, 2013), my findings provide
a preview of the consequences of such policies.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the institutional
background of the federal policy and describes the data. Section 3.3 discusses the
research design, sets up the causal inference framework, and introduces the Causal
Tree and Forest estimation. Section 3.4 reports the results. Section 3.5 discusses the
plausible mechanisms. In Section 3.6, I present some concluding comments.
3.2 Data and Institutional Background
3.2.1 Physician Open Payments Program
The federal Open Payments Program, also known as the “Sunshine Act,” was intro-
duced as part of the Affordable Care Act in 2010. It is a national disclosure program
operated by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to promote trans-
parency in healthcare marketing practice. Specifically, it requires full disclosure of
data on the financial relationships between the healthcare industry (pharmaceutical
and medical device companies operating in the US) and healthcare providers (physi-
cians and teaching hospitals) on a publicly accessible website.5 These financial rela-
tionships include any payments and transfers for marketing (food & beverage, speaker
fees, consulting, travel & lodging, and gifts & entertainments), physician ownership
and investment interests, and research purposes. Per the disclosure law, payments
that were $10 or more in value needed to be reported.6 The published data include the
identities of the payment recipients (name, professional degree, specialty, and address)
and the paying firms (name and address), date of payment, associated product, pay-
ment amount, and nature of payment. Open Payments is the only national resource
of its type for beneficiaries, consumers, physicians, and industry.7
The timeline of the data collection and reporting procedure is as follows:
• On August 1, 2013, pharmaceutical firms and device manufacturers started col-
lecting the required data;
5https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Downloads/Open-Payments-User-Guide.pdf
6When the total annual value of payments or other transfers of value is more than $100, all
payments need to be reported irrespective of the value of individual payments.
7https://www.cms.gov/openpayments/about/open-payments-data-in-context.html
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Figure 3.1: Potential Mechanisms of Disclosure in Changing Payments.
Note: First box is the scenario envisioned by the policy makers.
• By March 31, 2014, manufacturers reported the data between August 1 to De-
cember 31, 2013 to CMS. Physicians and teaching hospitals who have covered
records were invited to review the data and dispute any questionable records;
• On September 30, 2014, CMS reported the 2013 payment information on its Open
Payment Program website for the first time;
• On June 30 of the following years, CMS will report payment information from
the previous calendar year on its website.
Prior to the federal regulation, several states had enacted similar disclosure laws.8
Among them, three states (MA, MN, VT) made these data publicly available before
2013. While the federal regulation preempts any State or local laws requiring reporting
of the same types of financial information, the added effect of disclosure under federal
regulation is more limited among these three states than in other states without prior
disclosure law. Thus, I compare physicians from other states to physicians from these
three states to estimate the effect from payment disclosure. I discuss this in detail in
Section 3.3.
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3.2.2 Effect of Disclosure on Subsequent Payments
There are three main avenues by which disclosure of payment information could alter
subsequent payments (please refer to Figure 3.1 for a graphical representation of the
three mechanisms). First, the main motivation behind the disclosure law was that
increased transparency will be beneficial in reducing questionable financial relationships
between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians. The ideal scenario envisioned by
the law was that increased public scrutiny by patients and payers (insurance companies
and the government) will render physicians reluctant to accept payments and firms
less willing to offer them (Pham-Kanter, 2014; Chen et al., 2016). As Pham-Kanter,
2014 notes, such a tacit penalty for financial transactions between firms and physicians
would arise if (a) patients and payers are aware of the disclosure law and are sufficiently
motivated to seek this information, (b) they are sufficiently put off by such transactions,
and (c) they can act on this negative reaction by imposing some costs on physicians
and firms. As a result, there should be a decrease in payments.
Although this was the scenario envisioned by lawmakers, it is not clear if it would
have been realized. While I lack credible information on the extent to which the general
population is aware of the payment information (i.e. (a)), there has been increased
media coverage on this issue subsequent to disclosure. While Hwong et al. (2017)
find in an experiment with 278 participants that disclosure of industry payments to
physicians affected perceptions of individual physician honesty and fidelity, it did not
affect trust ratings for the medical profession or the pharmaceutical industry. Finally,
for the public scrutiny mechanism to be effective, patients and payers should be able
to sanction physicians for participating in questionable financial transactions. On
the patient side, they should be able to credibly signal that they can switch away
from physicians with questionable transactions. This might be hindered if patients
experience considerable search and switching costs (e.g., fewer available physicians
within their insurance network). On the payer side, insurers could decide to reimburse
only doctors who do not accept payments and drop those that do from their network.
Such a threat would be credible only if insurance companies have significantly more
bargaining power than the network of physicians.
The second mechanism is based on the idea that healthcare providers can observe
payments received by their peers from the same paying brand. This can lead to compar-
8These states include: Maine (2004), West Virginia (2004), Minnesota (1993), Massachusetts
(2008), Vermont (2001), and District of Columbia (2003). California instituted gift bans to healthcare
providers but did not require disclosure of the payments. As discussed subsequently, I exclude these
states in my empirical analysis.
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ison among peers regarding payments made by the same firm. The CEO compensation
disclosure literature sheds some light on the consequence of making such compensation
information public. This literature suggests that observing peers’ income could trig-
ger negotiations for payment parity (e.g. Gipper 2016), driving up the payments they
receive in the future. Borrowing from this logic, I expect payments to increase if the
physician comparison is the major consequence of the disclosure. Furthermore, such
comparison is likely to result in a decrease in payment disparity across physicians for
the same drug.
The third mechanism invokes the idea that disclosure of payments would enable
competing firms to observe which physicians are targeted by their rivals as well as the
magnitude of such patronage. Note that prior to public disclosure, such competitive
information is generally not available to firms. They can respond to such competitive
information in two alternative ways. In the first scenario, disclosure can result in a
bidding war, wherein firms end up imitating one another (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006).
Low-paying firms might be motivated to catch up with rivals to stay competitive, while
high-paying firms might realize that they are overpaying certain physicians and reduce
their payments to match those of their rivals. Thus, imitation by rival firms can either
lead to an increase or decrease in payments depending on the relative strength of
these two effects. In the second scenario, firms could choose to differentiate themselves
(Athey et al., 2011) by focusing on certain physicians where they have competitive
advantage. They can increase (decrease) payments among physician-drug pairs with
stronger (weaker) financial relationships. This can result in a net increase or decrease
in payments to the physician subsequent to disclosure depending on which force is more
dominant.
3.2.3 Data Description
3.2.3.1 Anti-diabetics market
Diabetes has become a prevalent public health concern worldwide. As of 2015, 30.3 mil-
lion Americans - 9.4% of the US population - had diabetes.9 As a result, anti-diabetic
medications have become one of the fastest-growing categories in the pharmaceutical
industry. Consequently, rival pharmaceutical firms have introduced many new drugs
into the market, bringing in intensive competition, thereby drawing generous market-
ing expenditures. The dynamics in this market makes it a good test field to study the
9National Diabetes Statistics Report, 2017. See https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/
national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf
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effect of payment disclosure on subsequent payments between firms and physicians.
Anti-diabetics is a large category of drugs that treat diabetes mellitus by lowering
glucose levels in the blood. Frequently used anti-diabetics include: (1) insulin (a
hormone that stimulates glucose uptake and lipid synthesis), (2) agents that increase
the sensitivity of target organs to insulin (sensitizers), (3) agents that increase the
amount of insulin secreted by the pancreas (secretagogues), and (4) agents that decrease
the rate at which glucose is absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract (glycosurics).10
Depending on the nature of the diabetes, different subclasses of the anti-diabetics are
used. For type 1 diabetes caused by the lack of insulin, regular insulin injection is
the only valid treatment. For type 2 diabetes (the most common type of diabetes,
T2DM) that is caused by cells’ resistance to insulin, multiple treatments can be used.
Metformin is the first-line medication for the treatment of type 2 diabetes by improving
insulin sensitivity (i.e., Sensitizers). It is available as a generic with zero marketing
payments and therefore excluded from my sample.
The 16 brands in my data fall into four subclasses of anti-diabetics: insulin,
Glucagon-Like Peptide-1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists (secretagogues), Dipeptidyle Pep-
tidase4 (DPP-4) inhibitors (secretagogues), and Sodium-Glucose Co-Transporter-2
(SGLT-2) inhibitors (glycosurics). Both GLP-1 receptor agonists and DPP-4 inhibitors
are lower blood glucose by increasing insulin release from the pancreatic β cells. Thus,
the four sub-classes of anti-diabetics in my sample include two types of secretagogues:
GLP-1 and DPP-4. DPP-4 inhibitors block the action of DPP-4, an enzyme that in-
activates incretins (such as GLP-1) that help the body produce more insulin. On the
other hand, GLP-1 receptor agonists bind to the membrane GLP-1 receptor, preventing
uptake of GLP-1 from the blood. This raises the level of blood GLP-1, stimulating in-
sulin secretion and suppressing glucagon secretion (Drucker and Nauck, 2006). SGLT-2
inhibitors are a new group of oral medications used for treating type 2 diabetes, ap-
proved in 2013. They inhibit the sodium-glucose transport proteins (SGLT-2) that
help re-absorb glucose into the blood, and pass out the excess glucose as urine (Kalra,
2014).
Except for Metformin (excluded from my data as a zero-payment generic), no single
brand is highlighted according to the Standards of Medical Care in Diabetes (Ameri-
can Diabetes Association 2015). Overall, physicians have discretion in the drug they
prescribe within a subclass of anti-diabetics. Thus, manufacturers are motivated to
influence physician prescription decisions through providing monetary incentives.
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-diabetic medication
49
3.2.3.2 Payment Data
I downloaded the payment data for the 29-month period between August 2013 and
December 2015 from the Physician Open Payment website in mid-2016. These data
contain the dollar value of the gift/payment that transpired between a named physician
and a named company, the nature of payment (e.g. meals, travel, consulting, and
speaker fees), the associated products for which the payments were made, and the date
of payment (see section 3.2.1). Note that my sample does not include any research-
related expenditure. For my analysis, I aggregated the data to the level of a month for
each physician-drug pair. As mentioned earlier, I focus on the anti-diabetics market.
In order to guarantee that there is enough information prior to disclosure to con-
trol for physician-drug idiosyncrasies, I exclude one-off financial ties and focus on the
monthly payment sequences between physician-drug pairs who have paid at least twice
before disclosure. The 16 anti-diabetics (marketed by nine firms) included in my anal-
ysis satisfy three conditions: they have been paying physicians at least 10 times in
the observation window, at least two months before the 2014 disclosure and have at
least ten physicians from the three states with prior disclosure laws (MA, VT, MN).11
In addition to the payment data, CMS provides a separate dataset on the profile of
all paid physicians, including their full name, physical addresses, licensed states, and
specialty. For each physician, I obtained their National Provider Identifier (NPI), gen-
der, medical school graduation year, the size of the associated practice group, and the
number of claims-based hospitals from the Physician Compare National Downloadable
File.12
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of the Payment Panel.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Payment/physician-drug-month ($) 5,826,216 20.10 356.04 0 97,004.84
29-month total USD/physician ($) 49,999 2,341.89 20,128 0.70 1,103,088
29-month total USD/drug ($) 16 7,318,421 9,981,005 286,325.3 30,657,472
My final sample consists of $118 million monthly payments from 16 branded anti-
diabetics to 49,999 physicians between August 2013 and December 2015 who have been
actively prescribing during the observation window. The average monthly payment
between a drug and a physician is $20, with the highest payment reaching $97,004
11This is to guarantee that I have enough control units to match to the treated units. I will discuss
it in more details in the research design section.
12https://data.medicare.gov/data/physician-compare. I match physicians based on first name, last
name and state. The matching rate is 77.4%.
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(Table 3.1). From August 2013 to December 2015, an average physician received $2,342
from all paying drugs, while an average drug paid $7.3 million to all physicians in the
sample (Table 3.1). In my sample, six major payment purposes are recorded in the
nature of payment field: consulting fee, speaker events, food and beverage, education,
travel and lodging, and honoraria (Table 3.2). While payments for physicians serving
as a speaker cost firms the most money (63% of the total dollar amount), payments
for food and beverage covers more than 98% of the physician population in my sample
(49,085). Given the sparsity of the payment events other than for food and beverage,
I aggregate payments of different nature to physician-drug-month level.
Table 3.2: Share of Payment Nature in 29-Month Window.
Nature of Payment Dollar Share Payment Recipients
Speaker Fee∗ 62.7% 1,124
Food and Beverage 23.6% 49,085
Travel and Lodging 7.24% 1,152
Consulting Fee 5.8% 1,191
Education 0.69% 13,991
Honoraria 0.02% 23
*This includes serving as a faculty or a speaker at a venue other than
a continuing education program.
3.2.3.3 Supplemental Data
I supplement the payment data with annual data on prescriptions for each physician
from the Medicare Part D Prescriber Public Use File (PUF).13 The dataset records the
total number of prescriptions that were dispensed at the physician-drug-year level under
the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Program. Each physician is identified by their
National Provider Identifier (NPI) and each drug is identified by its brand name and
generic name. The data also contain the total drug cost, consisting of “the ingredient
cost of the medication, dispensing fees, sales tax, and any applicable administration fees
and is based on the amount paid by the Part D plan, Medicare beneficiary, government
subsidies, and any other third-party payers.”14 Note that prescriptions covered under
13The Part D Prescriber PUF is based on information from CMS’s Chronic Condi-
tions Data Warehouse, which contains Prescription Drug Event records submitted by Medi-
care Advantage Prescription Drug (MAPD) plans and by stand-alone Prescription Drug
Plans (PDP). https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/PartD2013.html
14https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/PartD2013.html
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Medicare Part D represent only a part of all prescriptions written by each physician.
In addition, these physician level prescriptions are available only at the annual level.
I divide the total drug cost by the total prescriptions of that drug to obtain the unit
price in 2013.
Since the disclosure law came into effect in the middle of the calendar year, I cannot
cleanly match these data to the pre- and post-regimes even at the annual level (recall
that my pre-disclosure payments data start in August 2013 and the treatment occurs
mid 2014). However, these data are useful to me in three ways. First, I match physi-
cians based on their pre-disclosure prescription pattern (i.e., total 2013 prescriptions)
in each of the subclasses of anti-diabetics (I lump all other prescriptions into an “other”
group). Second, I investigate whether the treatment effects differ across physicians in
terms of their prescribing patterns. Third, I use these prescription data to perform
some robustness checks as detailed in Section 3.4.2.1.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Key Drug and Physician Characteristics.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Drug Age in 2014 16 6 5.65 0 18
2013 unit price/drug ($) 14∗ 367.69 76.87 263.07 567.47
2013 total Rx/drug (log$) 16 9.31 4.61 0 14.06
Pre-disclosure total payment/drug (log$) 16 14.44 1.29 12.28 16.43
Parental Company on ProPublica 16 0.563 0.512 0 1
Female 49,999 0.292 0.454 0 1
Physician Graduation Year 49,999 1989 11 1933 2015
Size of associated practice group 49,999 101 218 0 5,616
2013 total Rx/physician 49,999 6,610.5 6,592.1 11 150,475
2013 anti-diabetics Rx/physician 49,999 508.6 572.6 0 10,299
#paying drugs pre-disclosure/physician 49,999 4 3 1 16
*There is no 2013 price data for Tanzeum and Farxiga as they entered market in early 2014.
I summarize the key drug and physician characteristics constructed in the sample
in Table 3.3. In 2014, the 16 drugs have been on market for an average of six years. Of
these, Humalog is the oldest and Farxiga is the newest. During 2013, the average unit
price per drug is $367, based on the amount paid by the Part D plan. Nesina is the
cheapest drug at $263 per claim, and Victoza is the most expensive among all ($567
per claim). In 2013, an average anti-diabetic in the sample was prescribed 11,048 times
in the nation, with Lantus the most frequently used. I include additional information
regarding the manufacturer, the drug subclass and the initial approval date of each
drug, please refer to appendix Table B.1.
As of 2015, these physicians had mean of 26 years of experience after graduating
52
from the medical school, although there is considerable heterogeneity in experience
(standard deviation of 11 years). On average, these physicians are associated with
a group practice containing 100 other physicians, but some physicians do practice
alone. In 2013, an average physician filed for 6,610 prescription claims in Medicare
Part D, among which 508 (7.7%) were for anti-diabetics. During the 14 months before
disclosure, while some physicians were paid by all the 16 drugs that I consider, an
average physician was paid by four drugs.
3.2.3.4 Descriptive Analysis
I begin by comparing the four drug classes in terms of their payments made to physi-
cians, number of prescriptions, and price. I report these statistics in Table 3.4. Insulins
are the most frequently prescribed anti-diabetics, with the lowest unit price and pay-
ments towards the physicians in my sample. DPP4 Inhibitors are the second most
prescribed anti-diabetics, spending the least in persuading these physicians. GLP1
receptor agonists, on the contrary, are part of the most expensive subclass. At the
same time, they have the largest expenditure towards gifts/payments to physicians.
However, they have fewer prescriptions than insulins and DPP4 inhibitors. SGLT2
inhibitors are the newest anti-diabetics initially approved in 2013. They receive the
fewest prescriptions but have the highest per-drug expenditure, plausibly mostly due
to their newness.
Table 3.4: Subclass Comparison in the Sample.
Sub-Class 29-Month Pay ($) Pay/drug ($) 2013 Rx Unit Price 2013 ($) N drugs
Insulin 17,624,346 3,524,869.2 2,621,476 375 5
DPP4 Inhibitors 14,358,327 2,393,054.5 659,225 316 6
GLP1-R Agonists 50,712,054 16,904,018 184,543 517 3
SGLT2 Inhibitors 34,400,006 17,200,003 9,955 342 2
Building on these preliminary data patterns, I investigate if there is a relationship
between pre-disclosure payments and the prices of the drugs. I present a scatter plot
of the pre-disclosure payments made by the drugs and their prices in Figure 3.2. These
results suggest that more expensive drugs are significantly associated with higher pay-
ments to physicians during the 14 pre-disclosure months. Hence, if there is concern
that physician payments might influence prescriptions, this data pattern suggest that
payments can potentially increase the cost of healthcare by shifting to more expen-
sive treatment options. Further, I wanted to explore if there is a relationship between
the total number of prescriptions written by a physician and the payments that she
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receives. To this end, I divide physicians into five quintiles based on the total dollars
they received from all paying drugs during the 14 pre-disclosure months. As is shown
in Figure 3.3, heavier prescribers were paid more (with the payment quintile increas-
ing from 1 to 5). This is consistent with firms allocating more resources towards the
heavier prescribers in their direct-to-physician marketing (Manchanda et al., 2004).
Together, I find that 1) more expensive drugs tend to spend more on physicians and
2) heavier prescribers tend to be paid more by firms. Therefore, conflict-of-interest, if
it exists, is likely to be more profound among these expensive drugs and heavy pre-
scribers, thereby raising concerns about the role of payments in driving up the cost of
healthcare. Therefore, if the objective of disclosure is to reduce subsequent payments,
it would be desirable to have greater effect for more expensive drugs and among heavier
prescribers.
Figure 3.2: Correlation between Pre-Disclosure Payments and 2013 Drug Price.
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between Physician Payment and Physician Prescriptions.
3.3 Research Design and Methodology
Recall that my objective is to estimate the causal effect of public disclosure of payments
on subsequent payments. In order to accomplish this, I need to know how much
each physician would have been paid by a drug company if the payment information
had not been disclosed. I can then compare this against the realized payments post
disclosure to infer the causal effect of the policy intervention. Since I do not observe
the same physician-drug pair under both “disclosed” and “non-disclosed” conditions
at the same time, I cannot make this comparison directly. Furthermore, given my
context, randomized experiments are not feasible. Therefore, I have to approach this
causal inference problem using observational data.
As I discuss below, my empirical setting constitutes a quasi-experiment in that
I have an exogenous shock due to the federal policy intervention that influences the
states differently. Specifically, while most of the states did not institute any payment
disclosure laws before the federal intervention in 2014, certain states (MA, VT, MN)
did have similar state disclosure laws that made the industry payments received by
in-state healthcare providers public. All stakeholders in these states could therefore
see how each physician was pursued by rival firms even before the date of federal
disclosure. However, in states without prior disclosure regulation, this information
was not available until the date of federal disclosure. This variation in the level of
information across states creates a quasi-experimental setting to study how subsequent
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payments will change due to provision of payment information. In my case, the control
group consists of physicians from the states with prior disclosure laws, while the treated
group consists of physicians from the states without prior laws. The treatment under
investigation is whether the firms and physicians receive any new information from
the federal payment disclosure in 2014. Note that although Maine, West Virginia,
District of Columbia, and California did not have prior public disclosure laws, they
had instituted some form of restrictions on physicians receiving payments from industry
sources. Therefore, I exclude these territories from my analysis.
My difference-in-difference research design addresses a common concern with before-
after designs that payments might have changed over time as a result of factors other
than the payment disclosure, thereby rendering a before-after comparison of payments
in the treated states an invalid estimate of the treatment effect. For example, fluctua-
tion in the macro-economic factors could have influenced payments. In addition, some
market-specific characteristics could also have contributed to the temporal changes in
payment. As discussed in section 3.2.3.1, anti-diabetics is a heavily R&D-active cat-
egory with new medications being constantly approved. Since new drugs are usually
launched nationally and influence the control and treated states at the same time, this
effect could be captured by the payment changes in the control states. While these
unobserved factors remain the same across all the states, by implementing a diff-in-
diff comparison, I exploit the fact that firms, physicians, patients, and payers from the
treated states obtain more new information about payments from the federal disclosure
than those in control states. Measuring the payment changes in the treated states on
top of the changes captured by the control states could give me a “cleaner” and more
conservative estimate of the effect from payment disclosure.
As discussed earlier, by the end of 2015, the federal government had collected 29
months of payment data subsequent to the implementation of the disclosure law. Of
these, 14 months were prior to the public disclosure of the payment data. Thus, I
evaluate the effect of payment disclosure on subsequent payments by comparing the
changes in payments between a physician-drug pair from the 14 months pre-disclosure
to 15 months post-disclosure, across the control and treated groups. The identifying
assumption in such a diff-in-diff design is that, without the payment disclosure, the
average monthly payment in the treated and control groups follow a parallel trend
before and after disclosure. That is, the federal payment disclosure is the only reason
why treated and control groups would show different patterns around the time of
this intervention. Therefore, the validity of such a diff-in-diff design hinges on the
comparability of physicians from the treated and control states.
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In Table 3.5, I compare the average monthly payment per drug-physician pair across
the states with and without prior disclosure laws, before and after ACA disclosure. This
comparison suggests that, both pre and the post payment levels in the states without
prior laws appear to be much lower than those in the states with prior laws. Specifically,
the average payment in the former is only about half of those in the latter. This raises
the concern about the comparability of MA, VT, MN to all the other states as a whole.
As a first step towards matching, I restrict the comparison to their neighbor states:
CT (vs. MA), NH (vs. VT) and WI (vs. MN). For each state pair, their historical
trends in the age-adjusted percentage rate of adult diabetes are highly similar to each
other (See appendix Figure B.1). As can be seen from Table 3.5, row 4, the average
payments in these neighbor states are closer to the payment levels in MA, VT and MN.
Table 3.5: Raw Diff-In-Diff Comparison of the Average Monthly Payment per Drug-
Physician Pair
Pre ACA Disclosure Post ACA Disclosure Post - Pre
States w/o prior laws $21.00 $18.72 -$2.28 (10.86%)
States w/ prior laws∗ $49.26 $35.21 -$14.05 (28.52%)
NoLaw- HadLaw -$28.26 -$16.49 $11.77 (41.65%)
Neighbor states w/o prior laws§ $32.85 $29.39 -$3.46 (10.53%)
Neighbor NoLaw- HadLaw -$16.41 -$5.82 $10.59 (64.53%)
* States with prior disclosure laws were MA, VT, MN.
§The neighbor states to MA, VT, MN considered here are CT, NH, WI.
In months with no payment between a drug-physician pair, the payment is recorded as 0.
No fixed effects or physician-level matching. Percentage reported is relative to pre-disclosure level.
These patterns highlight the importance of matching physicians in the treatment
states with appropriate counterparts in the control states while executing my diff-in-
diff research design. In what follows, I discuss the general framework and conditions
required for causal inference. I then describe various approaches to matching, including
the setup of Causal Forest approach. As I discuss subsequently, the causal forest
approach helps in estimating the average treatment effect as well as the heterogeneity
in this effect across treatment units (physician-drug pairs in my case). Recovering
heterogeneous treatment effects would serve two purposes. First, it would help policy
makers evaluate the effectiveness of the regulation and identify potential avenues to
improve effectiveness. Moreover, recovering heterogeneous treatment effects would help
me uncover plausible mechanisms that potentially drove the treatment effect. This,
in turn, would help me comment not only on what happened as a result of payment
disclosure, but also potentially why it happened.
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3.3.1 Alternative Approaches for Matching
3.3.1.1 Unconfoundedness and Conditional Average Treatment Effect
(CATE)
I begin this discussion by considering the case of one drug. Extending this to the case
of multiple drugs is relatively straight forward. For a set of i.i.d. physicians i = 1, ..., n.,
I observe a vector of d covariates (features) Xi ∈ R, a response metric Yi ∈ R, and a
treatment assignment Wi ∈ {0, 1}. In my case, Yi is the difference between the post-
disclosure and pre-disclosure average monthly payment the physician received from
the drug. Wi is the indicator for whether the physician is from the states without
prior disclosure law. My Xi contains three sets of features: a) the full 14-month pre-
disclosure payment sequences the physician received from all 16 drugs; b) the 2013
prescription patterns of the physician for anti-diabetics within each subclass as well
as those for all other non-anti-diabetic medications, and c) physician demographics.
Following the potential outcomes framework (Rubin, 1974; Imbens and Rubin, 2015),
the causal inference problem in observational studies (e.g. the quasi-experiment in out
case) can be expressed as estimating the conditional average treatment effect (CATE):
τ(x) = E
[
Y
(W=1)
i − Y (W=0)i
∣∣∣Xi = x] , (3.1)
if the unconfoundedness assumption holds:
Wi ⊥
{
Y
(0)
i , Y
(1)
i
} ∣∣∣Xi. (3.2)
I can estimate the CATE by considering the nearby observations in the x-space
as if these observations come from a randomized experiment. The idea is that these
physicians are similar to each other in terms of their observable characteristics and can
be considered as “clones”, with the only difference being that a subset of them are
from the treated states. The most common “clone-finding” method in the literature
is the Propensity Score Matching (PSM, e.g. Hirano et al., 2003, Imbens and Rubin,
2015), which proceeds in two stages. The first-stage involves parametric estimation of
the treatment propensity for each physician (i.e., belonging to the treated vs. control
state) based on user-specified matching variables and the propensity function. In the
second-stage, I can estimate the ATE by comparing the outcomes from the treated and
the control physicians with the same estimated treatment propensity.
More formally, define e(x) = E [Wi | Xi = x] as the propensity to receive treatment
at x. I am able to directly estimate CATE by inverse propensity weighting if I know
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e(x) :
τ(x) = E
[
Yi
(
Wi
e(x)
− 1−Wi
1− e(x)
) ∣∣∣∣∣Xi = x
]
. (3.3)
The conventional practice in PSM is to impose parametric specification in estimat-
ing the propensity score, e(x) (e.g. Hirano et al., 2003, Imbens and Rubin, 2015).
However, when the space of covariates grows large, the conventional implementations
that rely on kernel or series estimation of the propensity score become very cumber-
some (Athey and Imbens, 2017). While there have been several revisions proposed to
the way of propensity score estimation to deal with large number of covariates (e.g.
McCaffrey et al., 2004), these weighting methods have been found to be sensitive to the
exact implementation, e.g. using logit versus probit models (see Athey and Imbens,
2017). Moreover, the weights can change substantially for units with extreme values of
propensity scores when using different specifications, thereby rendering the estimators
less robust than those obtained from non-parametric methods.
3.3.1.2 Causal Tree and Forest
I address the concerns associated with propensity score matching through a forest-
based algorithm (Causal Forest, CF) that is computationally efficient, robust to model
mis-specifications, and achieves desired consistency and asymptotic normality when
estimating the heterogeneous treatment effect at the individual level (Wager and Athey,
2017). Forest-based models (Breiman, 2001) are one of the most popular supervised
machine learning methods in computer science and engineering, known for reliable “out-
of-the-box” performance without much model tuning (Athey and Imbens, 2017). While
mostly used for prediction tasks (e.g. Berk, 2012), these models have recently been
adapted for causal inferences in marketing settings (e.g. to understand the effectiveness
of online ad campaigns (Wang et al., 2015), and to identify customers at high risk of
churning (Ascarza, 2016)).
At a high level, tree- and forest-based models help in finding the most similar ob-
servations locally in the covariate space with an adaptive neighborhood metric. This is
different from the classical kNN methods, where the algorithm finds k nearest neigh-
bors according to some pre-defined distance metric (i.e., a kernel). Trees (the com-
ponent units of a forest) cluster the most similar observations into the same leaf (i.e.
a terminal node), where the leaf is wider along the directions with higher degree of
homogeneity and narrower along directions with higher degree of heterogeneity. All
observations within the same leaf are considered to have i.i.d. responses. This adaptive
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nature of trees can substantially increase the power of accurate clustering with large
space of covariates.
Researchers have developed forest-based methods that use a large number of trees
as opposed to relying on a single tree. This is because a single tree might not represent
the “best” characterization of the data, especially when the feature set is also large.
Forest-based methods were shown to yield significantly better prediction performance
in practice (Breiman, 2001). By constructing a “forest” of many independently grown
trees15 where each tree is grown using a random subsample of covariates (and in the
case of Causal Forest, a subsample of observations), I can reduce the model variance
and smooth sharp decision boundaries (Bu¨chlmann and Yu, 2002).
Athey and Imbens (2016) adapt the classical tree model into a Causal Tree to
estimate the within-leaf treatment effect as the difference between the means of Y
(0)
i∈l
and Y
(1)
i∈l in that leaf l. A key revision in their algorithm is to separately build the tree
structure and estimate the treatment effects given the structure using i.i.d. training
samples. This separation of “tree building” and “effect estimation” steps is essential
to obtain a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator for the treatment effects
within leaves. They call this “honesty”: a tree is “honest” if, for a unit i in the
training sample, it only uses the response Yi to estimate the within-leaf treatment
effect τi∈l = Y¯
(1)
i∈l − Y¯ (0)i∈l , or to decide where to place the splits, but not both (Athey
and Imbens, 2017; Wager and Athey, 2017).
In this paper, I estimate a forest version of the Causal Trees adapted for observa-
tional data (“propensity trees”, see Wager and Athey, 2017). This method achieves
honesty by first training classification trees for the treatment assignments Wi without
using information in Yi, and then estimating the within-leaf treatment effects using Yi
given the tree structure. The algorithm contains three stages (Figure 3.4): 1) building
a propensity tree; 2) estimating the heterogeneous treatment effects within the tree;
and 3) bootstrapping and aggregating (“bagging”) thousands of trees into a forest to
improve robustness and to obtain the confidence interval around the point estimate for
each physician-drug pair.
15Causal Forest and Random Forest algorithms grow each tree independently and therefore can
be easily paralleled. On the other hand, algorithms like gradient boosting adds new trees/classifiers
based on how well the existing trees/classifiers do. In that case, trees are not grown independently.
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Figure 3.4: An Illustration of the Three Stages in the Causal Forest Estimation.
Stage 1: Tree Building.
Let|T | denote the number of leaves in a tree T ; NL denote the number of observations
in a leaf L; pL =
1
NL
∑
Xi∈L I(Wi = 1) denote the proportion of treated observations in
a leaf L; and QL(T ) = 2pL(1− pL) denote the impurity measure for leaf L. Given the
data and a set of candidate covariates (“features”), the algorithm grows a classification
tree T by repetitively partitioning the data into two subgroups along the covariate (and
at the best cutoff if the covariate is continuous) that gives the largest drop in the total
impurity of all the leaves (termination groups) produced after this partition. At each
leaf, the algorithm will continue to partition the data until it reaches the termination
criteria that there is at least k observations of each class in a leaf. Formally, at each split
the algorithm solves a one-dimensional optimization problem by picking the covariate
and the threshold at which to cut the data:
min
T
C(T ) =
|T |∑
L=1
NLQL(T ), (3.4)
s.t. |{i : Wi = 1, Xi ∈ L}| ≥ k, |{i : Wi = 0, Xi ∈ L}| ≥ k, ∀L ∈ T .
The parameter k can be formally picked by cross-validation.16 I end up with a
tree (i.e. “propensity tree”) that partitions observations into subgroups, within which
observations have the same propensity, pL, to be treated. In other words, observations
within the same leaf are considered roughly from a random experiment.
16In my empirical analysis, I tried different values of k and find that the estimation results are
substantively the same.
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Stage 2: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Estimation.
Given the tree partitions, I can estimate the within-leaf treatment effects by taking the
difference between the mean outcomes of treated and control units in the same leaf:
τˆ(x) =
1
|{i : Wi = 1, Xi ∈ L}|
∑
{i:Wi=1,Xi∈L}
Yi − 1|{i : Wi = 0, Xi ∈ L}|
∑
{i:Wi=0,Xi∈L}
Yi.
(3.5)
Because the tree is grown by repetitively solving the one-dimensional optimization
problem locally (thus the algorithm is “greedy”), each tree is grown in a deterministic
manner. That is, given the same data input and the same feature set, you always end up
with the same tree. This makes a single tree pretty sensitive to the outliers in the data
as well as the irrelevant features supplied to the algorithm. In addition, the greediness
of the algorithm does not guarantee any single tree structure to be globally optimal
(because at each split the algorithm optimizes without incorporating the subsequent
consequences of taking this split). To improve the robustness of the final estimation, I
bootstrap and aggregate (i.e. “bagging”) thousands of independently grown trees into
a forest, which is shown to give much better model performance in practice (Breiman,
2001).
Stage 3: Bagging Trees into a Forest.
I build the Causal Forest in observational data by growing the propensity trees B times,
each time with a random subsample of covariates and observations. The forest gives
the final predictions by averaging over the estimates from B trees:
τˆ(x) = B−1
B∑
b=1
τˆb(x), (3.6)
where τˆb(x) is the treatment effect estimate from the b-th tree. To measure the ran-
domness in τˆ(x) due to the training sample, I estimate the variance of the Causal
Forest in the following way (Efron, 2014; Wager, 2014):
Vˆ (x) =
n− 1
n
(
n
n− s
)2 n∑
i=1
Cov [τˆb(x), Nib]
2 , (3.7)
where Nib ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether observation i is used for the b-th tree, n−1n
(
n
n−s
)2
is a finite-sample correction for forests grown by subsampling without replacement,
and the covariance is taken with respect to all B trees in this forest. τˆ(x) from eq.3.6
is shown to be asymptotically Gaussian and unbiased; and Vˆ (x) from eq.3.7 is proven
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consistent (Wager and Athey, 2017).
Because a physician i can be clustered with different groups of physicians across
different trees in the forest, I can construct a point estimate of treatment effect and
the confidence interval for each i. A large variance estimate for i indicates a high level
of variation in the outcomes from its neighbor observations across the trees, suggesting
that the matching of i to its closest neighbors in x-space is less than ideal. With the
model variance incorporated in the confidence intervals, I am able to determine which
subgroups have significantly adjusted their payments responding to the information
disclosure.
In practice, I estimate the individual-level treatment effects for each drug sep-
arately. I estimate the Causal Forest model for Yid =
1
T1
∑
t logUSDidt|t∈T1 −
1
T0
∑
t logUSDidt|t∈T0 for a given drug d,
17 which is the change in average monthly
log payment between a physician i and the drug d going from pre-disclosure period
(T0) to the post-disclosure period (T1). Using logs allows me to evaluate differences in
payments across physicians and drugs in relative terms. Throughout the estimations
for all drugs, I obtain point estimates for individual treatment effects using 5-fold cross
prediction. That is, I train a Causal Forest model using four folds (80%) and predict
for the fifth fold (20%). I loop over the 5 folds and obtain predictions for the whole
sample. This procedure is implemented to avoid overfitting.
The covariate vector Xi contains three parts of features: 1) the 14-month drug-
specific payment sequences physician i received from each of the 16 anti-diabetics in
the sample; 2) the annual number of 2013 Medicare Part D prescriptions physician i
wrote for every subclass of anti-diabetics, as well as all other medications as a whole;
3) physician demographics, including gender, medical school graduation year, the size
of the affiliated group practice, and the number of claims-based hospitals associated
with the physician. The idea is to find clusters of physicians who have similar pay-
ment sequences and prescription patterns prior to disclosure, and are demographically
comparable.
3.4 Results and Discussion
I begin by discussing the baseline findings from the panel regression and propensity
score matching estimation. I then present the results from Causal Forest estimation.
17In practice, the log transformation is done in the form of log(USD+1) to keep all zero payment
observations.
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3.4.1 Panel Regression and Propensity Score Matching
To obtain the basic idea of the average treatment effect of disclosure on subsequent
payments, I regress the log payment received by physician i from drug d in month
t onto the interaction between the treatment state dummy Di and the post-period
dummy POSTt.
logPayidt = β1Di ∗ POSTt + Iid + Idt + idt. (3.8)
Di equals 0 if the physician is from MA, VT, or MN and 1 otherwise. POSTt equals
zero if the month is between August 2013 and September 2014, and one otherwise. I
control for differences across physicians and drugs in terms of payments by including
physician-drug fixed effects (i.e., Iid), and allow for a different time trend for each
drug by including drug-month fixed effects (i.e., Idt). The main effects of Di and
POSTt are absorbed by the physician-drug fixed effects and the drug-month fixed
effects respectively and are thus omitted from the equation.
I report the panel regression results in Table 3.6. The coefficient on the interaction
term, β1, represents the estimate of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE). The results
in column 1 are based on the analysis that includes all the treated states. The ATE
estimate suggests a positive, yet insignificant effect of the disclosure on subsequent
payments. A potential concern with this analysis is that physicians in the treated states
may not be strictly comparable to those in the control states. Therefore, I attempt
to “match” the two groups of physicians by considering those operating in states that
are geographically proximate to the three states with prior payment disclosure laws.
Specifically, I only include the neighbor states to MA, VT, and MN: CT, NH and WI.
As discussed in appendix Figure B.1, these states demonstrate similar historical trends
in the age-adjusted percentage rate of adult diabetes to MA, VT and MN respectively.
I report these results in column 2 of Table 3.6. I see that with very basic comparability
control (by looking at the similar neighbor states), the sign of the ATE changes to
negative, although the effect continues to be statistically insignificant.
Next, I consider a more formal matching approach: propensity score matching
(PSM). In the PSM estimation, I aggregate the payment data by physician-drug pair
(in log form) and obtain the difference between the average log monthly payments
post- and pre-disclosure as my dependent variable. The matching variables I consider
in estimating the treatment propensity in the first-stage include: 1) physician demo-
graphics, such as gender, medical school graduation year, size of the associated prac-
tice group, and number of claims-based hospitals (where physicians practice); 2) drug
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Table 3.6: Panel Regression Results.
(1) (2)
All States Neighbor States§
Di ∗ POSTt 0.0096 -0.016
(0.0139) (0.0174)
Observations 5,826,361 225,939
physician-drug FE YES YES
drug-month FE YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by physicians.
§Only the neighbor states (CT, NH, WI) to MA, VT, MN are included as the treated group.
The dependent variable is the log monthly payment per physician-drug pair.
characteristics, such as 2013 total prescription volumes per drug, 2013 unit price, pre-
disclosure total payments to physicians (i.e., payments prior to disclosure), subclasses,
and approval dates; 3) 2013 prescription patterns per physician, for each subclass of
anti-diabetics and all non-antidiabetics (from Medicare Part D data); and 4) the pre-
disclosure average monthly payment per physician-drug from each of the 16 drugs, for
the last five months in 2013 and the first nine months in 2014 respectively. In addition,
one can include the full sequence of the pre-disclosure monthly payments each physi-
cian received from all drugs when matching physicians. However, that will introduce
14 months*16 drugs = 224 additional variables into the estimation, making PSM in-
feasible. Instead, I attempt to account for the pre-disclosure payment trend in a very
simple manner by including only two measures of the monthly pre-disclosure payment
per physician-drug pair: the average monthly payment during the last 5 months in
2013 and during the first 9 months in 2014.
I report the PSM results using both logit and probit specifications in Table 3.7.
The robust standard errors adjust for the fact that the propensity scores are estimated
from the first-stage (see Abadie and Imbens, 2016). The results in Table 3.7 reveal
that using a logit specification gives a large, positive and statistically significant aver-
age treatment effect at about 20%. However, when I change the specification to probit,
the estimate becomes negative and insignificant (-9.5%). These estimates differ con-
siderably from each other as well as from those in the panel regression results. These
results highlight the concerns raised in the previous literature regarding the sensitivity
of PSM estimation results to the implementation approach (see Athey and Imbens,
2017). The lack of robustness of PSM estimation calls for comparison across a vari-
ety of methods to assess the overall findings. In particular, a more robust matching
algorithm under large covariate space is needed. As discussed earlier, the causal forest
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Table 3.7: Propensity Score Matching Results.
(1) (2)
All States, PSM-logit All States, PSM-probit
ATE 0.190*** -0.095
(0.0424) (0.134)
Observations 182,825 181,694
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Robust standard errors adjusted for the
propensity score estimation. Dependent variable is the difference between
the post and the pre average monthly payment (in log), per physician-
drug pair. No time-serial variation is included in this case. Sample sizes
are slightly different after dropping observations that violate the overlap
assumption in each specification.
method addresses these issues.
3.4.2 Causal Forest Estimation Results
Recall that the CF estimation helps me uncover different treatment effects for each
drug-physician pair. I plot the distribution of the estimated percentage change in the
monthly payment for a physician-drug pair in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Distribution of the Treatment Effect per Physician-Drug Pair.
I also summarize the distribution of the estimated treatment effects at the individual
level in Table 3.8. τˆ payid stands for the percentage change in monthly payments per drug-
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics of the Treatment Effects by Drug-Physician Pairs.
Monthly Payment Change N mean std min max
τˆpayid 199,085 -0.021 0.106 -0.530 0.354
τˆpayid |τˆpayid < 0 at 95% level 42,564 -0.156 0.074 -0.530 -0.022
τˆpayid |τˆpayid > 0 at 95% level 28,238 0.116 0.033 0.024 0.354
τˆGINIi 38,949
§ 0.043 0.0045 0.026 0.060
§Change in Gini is only measured for physicians paid both pre and post.
physician pair. On average, across all physician-drug pairs, payments declined by 2% as
a result of the disclosure. This result is consistent with those from the panel regression
with naive matching by considering the neighboring treated and control states (-1.59%).
Since the causal forest method enables me to make statistical inference of the treatment
effect by each physician-drug pair, I can comment on significance of the treatment
effect at this level of disaggregation. Overall, I find that 21% of the drug-physician
pairs show a significant decline at 95% level (conditional mean = -15.6%), and 14% of
the drug-physician pairs show a significant increase at 95% level (conditional mean =
11.6%).
I report the average payment changes by drug names (sorted by mean payment
change) in Table 3.9. These results suggest that there is a large heterogeneity across
drugs. For example, payments made by Novolog (insulin manufactured by Novo
Nordisk) declined by 27% as a result of disclosure. On the other hand, payments
made by Farxiga (new generation SGLT2 anti-diabetics, manufactured by AstraZeneca)
increased by 12%. Next, I consider how the average treatment effect varies across
drug-classes. I report these results in Table 3.10. These results suggest that GLP1-R
Agonists increased their payments while the other subclasses mostly decreased their
payments as a result of the disclosure.
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Table 3.9: Average Change(%) in Monthly Payment Per Capita by Drugs.
Drug Name N physicians mean std min max
NOVOLOG 10546 -0.274 0.035 -0.530 -0.163
OSENI 4409 -0.171 0.026 -0.405 -0.003
TRADJENTA 13722 -0.125 0.041 -0.420 0.023
NESINA 7780 -0.114 0.034 -0.199 0.166
INVOKANA 24356 -0.089 0.044 -0.336 0.355
ONGLYZA 4719 -0.049 0.027 -0.185 0.092
BYDUREON 22102 -0.048 0.023 -0.133 0.176
TANZEUM 2007 -0.039 0.024 -0.187 0.097
JANUVIA 9056 -0.030 0.020 -0.144 0.100
LANTUS 15727 -0.009 0.039 -0.301 0.312
JANUMET 4031 0.003 0.012 -0.133 0.081
APIDRA 5192 0.011 0.035 -0.211 0.116
LEVEMIR 30241 0.055 0.046 -0.238 0.250
VICTOZA 20779 0.071 0.057 -0.155 0.245
HUMALOG 9584 0.108 0.053 -0.039 0.210
FARXIGA 14156 0.119 0.038 -0.114 0.217
Table 3.10: Average Change(%) in Monthly Payment Per Capita by Sub-Classes.
Subclass Mean
DPP4 Inhibitor -0.088
SGLT2 inhibitor -0.013
Insulin -0.004
GLP1-R Agonists 0.007
3.4.2.1 Robustness Checks
Matching based on Post-Disclosure Payments In my research design, I con-
sider the states with prior disclosure laws as the control group because the agents in
these states did not receive any new information subsequent disclosure. Correspond-
ingly, when I match physicians in the treatment and control states, I use pre-treatment
payments as a matching variable. However, a potential concern is that prior to disclo-
sure, physicians in the treated and control states were in different disclosure regimes.
Therefore, if disclosure did change payments, physicians that received similar payments
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pre-disclosure in the treated states may not be strictly comparable to physicians re-
ceiving similar payments in the control states, which already had disclosure laws in
place.
In order to address this concern, I match physicians in the treated and the control
states based on post-disclosure payments when all physicians were subjected to the
same disclosure regime. I then investigate if the payments received by these physi-
cians in the treated states prior to the disclosure differed from those received by their
counterparts in the control states during the same time period. The rationale is that
subsequent to the ACA disclosure, both groups are under the same disclosure regime
and are therefore more similar to each other. This “reverse diff-in-diff” comparison
gives me an estimate of the effect from “not having the disclosure.” By reversing the
sign of this effect, I can recover the effect of “having disclosure.” I plot the estimation
in Figure 3.6. On average, the effect of disclosure as is estimated from this “reverse
diff-in-diff” setting is -4.3%. Among all drug-physician pairs, 31% of the drug-physician
pairs show significant changes, with the majority having the same sign/significance as
my earlier findings. The substantive conclusions are similar to those presented earlier.
Figure 3.6: Distribution of the Treatment Effect per Physician-Drug Pair, Reversed
Diff-In-Diff.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Payment Change (%) -0.043 0.108 -0.757 0.338
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Relationship between Changes in Prescriptions and Payments A potential
concern with my analysis is that the enactment of the disclosure law (rather than just
the data disclosure that I intend to study) might have changed the prescription behavior
of physicians. This, in turn, might have changed the payments made by pharmaceutical
firms. If this change in prescriptions and the corresponding payment rules coincided
with disclosure of payments, my estimate of the causal effect of disclosure is bound to
be contaminated. In order to verify if changes in prescriptions is a potential confounder
of the effect from disclosure, I check to see if there is a relationship between the change
in payments and the decline in anti-diabetics prescriptions between 2013 and 2015 in
the Medicare Part D data. I present the results from this analysis in Figure 3.7. These
results suggest that there is no relationship between the decline in prescriptions and
the corresponding changes in payments. Therefore, I do not believe that the treatment
effects pertaining to the change in payments as a result of disclosure were contaminated
by the concomitant decline in prescriptions.
Figure 3.7: Decline in Anti-Diabetics Prescriptions is Unrelated to the Decline in
Payments.
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3.4.3 Exploring Differences in Treatment Effects Across
Drugs and Physicians
As discussed earlier, if the objective of policy makers while mandating payment dis-
closure was to deter inappropriate financial relationships between the firms and the
physicians (Pham-Kanter, 2014; Santhakumar and Adashi, 2015), the policy would
have been effective if it led to steeper decline in payments for (a) expensive drugs, and
(b) physicians who wrote more prescriptions. Since I estimate the treatment effects
for each physician-drug pair (τˆ payid ), I can characterize the heterogeneity in this effect
across drugs and physicians. This can help me comment on the overall effectiveness
of the policy. Below, via a series of generalized linear regressions, I investigate the
relationship between the estimated treatment effects and drug and physician charac-
teristics. This analysis accounts for the fact that the dependent variables (i.e., the
treatment effects at the physician-drug level) are estimated rather than observed and
thus have an associated standard error (Hanushek, 1974 and Eichholtz et al., 2010).
3.4.3.1 Relationship between Payment Changes and Drug Characteristics
I explore the relationship between the estimated treatment effect (payment) changes
and drug characteristics using the following regression:
τˆ payid = α1LogPreUSDd + α2AvgPrePriced + α3LogPreRxd+
α4ProPublicaF irmd + α5ApprovalDated + Isubclass + Ii + id.
(3.9)
In essence, I regress τˆ payid onto the following set of covariates: total payment (to all
physicians) made by the drug during the pre-period in log form (LogPreUSDd), 2013
average drug price (AvgPrePriced), the pre-period total prescription level of the drug
in log form based on the 2013 data from Medicare Part D (LogPreRxd), drug ap-
proval dates, and a dummy for whether the parental firm has voluntarily disclosed any
aggregate payments in the past on ProPublica, controlling for the subclass dummies
Isubclass (insulin, SGLT2, GLP1, with DPP4 to be the omitted baseline) and physician
characteristics fixed effects Ii.
I report the regression results in Table 3.11. These results reveal that pre-disclosure
payments and the average drug price have a positive effect on the treatment effect. To-
gether, these results suggest that drugs with larger pre-disclosure payments to physi-
cians were associated with an increase or smaller decline in payments after disclosure.
Similarly, the effect of disclosure was muted among more expensive drugs.
71
Table 3.11: Relationship between Payment Changes and Drug Characteristics.
DV = τˆpayid (1) (2)
LogPreUSD 0.00588*** 0.00500***
(0.000528) (0.000665)
AvgPrePrice§ 0.00110*** 0.00119***
(6.43e-06) (8.46e-06)
LogPreRx§ 0.00605*** 0.00624***
(9.71e-05) (0.000127)
ProPublicaFirm 0.0372*** 0.0364***
(0.000505) (0.000655)
ApprovalDate 3.15e-05*** 3.45e-05***
(3.59e-07) (4.71e-07)
Intercept -1.177*** -1.256***
(0.00763) (0.0101)
Observations 182,808 182,808
physician FE NO YES
drug subclass dummy YES YES
R2 0.264 0.388
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by
physicians. Dependent variable is estimated treatment effect in payment
per physician-drug pair. §Average price and pre-disclosure prescriptions
measured via 2013 Medicare Part D data. I exclude Farxiga and Tanzeum
as they do not have 2013 price data.
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3.4.3.2 Relationship between Payment Changes and Physician Character-
istics
I explore the heterogeneity across physicians within the same drug brand along three
dimensions: a) the extent to which a physician was paid more heavily than other
physicians prior to disclosure, b) the extent to which a physician prescribed more anti-
diabetics than others prior to disclosure, and c) the extent to which a brand was leading
or lagging behind other brands in pursuing a given physician prior to disclosure. Of
these, (c) is a physician-drug characteristic in the sense that the same drug can be a
leading patron for some physicians, but lag behind its rivals for other physicians. On
the other hand, (a) and (b) are physician characteristics. Note that drugs did not have
this information about competitor behavior in (c) at physician level prior to disclosure.
For (a), I construct the physician popularity metric (POPi) as log of the total
payments a given physician received from all anti-diabetics brands pre-disclosure. For
(b), I use the anti-diabetics prescriptions (log) per physician based on the Medicare
data for 2013. For (c), within each physician, I generate the quantile ranks for each
paying drug based on their pre-disclosure payments’ ranking order, varying between
0 and 1 and the larger the higher ranked.18 These ranks reflect the extent to which
payments from the brand are likely to be salient from the physician’s point of view.
Since there will be variation in drug ranks only among physicians that was paid by
multiple drugs, I generate a “multipayer” dummy that equals 1 if the physician was
paid by more than one drug and 0 otherwise. I run the following specification with
physicians paid only by a single drug as the omitted baseline:
τˆ payid = α1POPi + α2Log2013AntiDiabeticsi + α3Multipayeri+
α4Multipayeri ∗Rankid + Ispecialty +X ′iβ + Id + ξid
(3.10)
where i indexes physician and d indexes drug. Each drug is allowed a different constant
term to capture the baseline differences across drugs (i.e. drug fixed effects). Xi are a
vector of physician control variables including gender, medical school graduation year,
size of the associated practice groups, and number of claims-based hospitals. I also
include specialty dummies for Internal Medicine (omitted baseline), Family Medicine,
Endocrinologists, other specialties, and dual specialties (Internal + Family). In the
first specification, I include control variables for physician characteristics but exclude
physician fixed effects to obtain the main effect estimates for the popularity metric,
18For example, for 3 drugs paying the same physician, the quantile ranks for them are 100%, 66%,
and 33%, respectively.
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the level of pre-disclosure prescriptions, and specialty dummies. In the remaining
two specifications, I add physician fixed effects, but exclude physician characteristics
that do not vary across drugs and check sensitivity of the results to the physician
unobservables. I cluster the standard errors by physicians.
I report the results from this analysis in Table 3.12 with drug fixed effects included
in all specifications. In column 1, I exclude physician fixed effects to obtain the main
effect estimates from popularity metric, physician prescription level, and specialty dum-
mies. The result indicates that more popular physicians (i.e., those receiving larger
payments) and heavier prescribers in the anti-diabetics category tend to have larger
increase/smaller decline in payments. Relative to physicians paid by a single firm,
multi-payer physicians tend to have larger increase/smaller decline in payments. This
positive effect increases as the drug moves up in the within-physician ranking (as is
measured by its payment to the physician). This effect is robust to including physician
fixed effects. In both columns 1 and 2, the positive significant effect on the interac-
tion term between Multipayeri and Rankid suggests that the low-paying drugs tend
to drop their payments more than the high-paying drugs regarding the same physician
they pay.19 When I allow this “rank” effect to vary by the degree of physician popu-
larity (column 3), the result indicates that the “rank” effect is only positive for more
popular physicians. In other words, the top paying drugs sustain their payments only
to the popular physicians. Among less popular physicians, all drugs tend to reduce
their payments.
In appendix B.1, I explore how the treatment effects vary by the nature of payment.
I discuss the possible conjecture consistent with the data pattern.
3.5 Discussion on Mechanisms
As discussed earlier, there are three main mechanisms that could result in public dis-
closure of payments having an effect on subsequent payments. First, public disclosure
could inform patients and payers (insurance companies and the government) about the
financial ties between their doctors and pharmaceutical companies. This can render
physicians less willing to accept payments. Second, physicians can see how much their
peers are getting paid by the pharmaceutical company. This comparison could result
in physicians seeking parity, which can lead to larger payments and plausibly lower
19The larger Rankid, the higher rank the drug paid the physician relative to the other paying drugs
to the same physician. The positive coefficient associated with Rankid suggests that if a drug ranks
higher, it would show smaller decline/larger increase.
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Table 3.12: Relationship between Payment Changes, Physician Popularity & Drug
Ranking within Physician.
DV = τˆpayid (1) (2) (3)
Popularity 0.00276***
(0.000143)
Log2013AntiDiabetics 0.000253***
(8.00e-05)
Multipayer -0.000571
(0.000605)
Multipayer*Rank 0.00839*** 0.00894*** -0.0266***
(0.000365) (0.000433) (0.00273)
Multipayer*Rank*Popularity 0.00575***
(0.000441)
Specialty Dummy§
Family Med 0.000691***
(0.000247)
Endocrinologists -0.00957***
(0.000547)
Internal + Family Med -0.00338***
(0.000938)
Others 0.00143***
(0.000320)
physician control variables:
Female -0.000278
(0.000240)
Medical School Graduation Year 0.000120***
(1.01e-05)
Practice Group Size 8.88e-06***
(1.06e-06)
Number of Hospitals -0.000240***
(7.18e-05)
Intercept -0.249*** 0.00780*** 0.00816***
(0.0202) (0.000547) (0.000545)
Observations 199,085 199,085 199,085
physician FE NO YES YES
drug FE YES YES YES
R2 0.856 0.903 0.904
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by physician.
§Internal Medicine is the omitted baseline.
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disparity in payments across physicians for the same brand. Third, pharmaceutical
firms can observe which physicians their rivals are patronizing. This information can
either lead to firms trying to match their rivals or differentiating from each other by
targeting different sets of physicians.
My data do not enable me to cleanly isolate the role of alternative mechanisms in
driving the causal effect of the payment disclosure on subsequent payments. Neverthe-
less, since the three alternative mechanisms yield different predictions regarding the
causal effect of the policy intervention, I attempt to comment on the most plausible
mechanism that drove the outcome. In order to do so, I consider the scenario wherein
the three mechanisms occur in isolation.
The first mechanism, based on increased public scrutiny, would predict a decrease in
payments subsequent to disclosure. While payments indeed declined on average, 14%
of physician-drug pairs in my sample show a significant increase in the payments post-
disclosure. Moreover, if public scrutiny did lead to differential pressure among drugs
and physicians, I would expect more negative effects on high priced drugs, high paying
drugs, and highly paid physicians. Recall that my results suggest the opposite pattern.
Together, these patterns do not appear to support the idea that public pressure was
the dominant driver behind the effect of disclosure on payments.
The second mechanism based on physicians comparing payments received by their
peers predicts 1) an increase in payments, and 2) a decline in the payment disparity
across physicians in the same social comparison group. For one, this is not consistent
with the statistically significant decrease in payments experienced by 21% of physician-
drug pairs in my sample. To test this second conjecture, I define my social comparison
group at the city level and measure the payment disparity across physicians who re-
ceived payments from the same drug in the same city, pre- and post-disclosure. Specif-
ically, for drug d paying Nd physicians in city c, I construct the Gini index during the
period t for drug d in city c as: GINI tdc =
1
Nd
(Nd + 1− 2 ∗
∑Nd
i=1(Nd+1−i)∗Yi∑Nd
i=1 Yi
), where Yi is
the total dollar amount physician i received from drug d during period t ∈ {pre, post}.
I compare this metric pre- and post-disclosure for the same city-brand. I find that
the payment disparity across the physicians in the same city receiving payments from
the same brand increased after the disclosure. Both pieces of evidence suggest that
physician comparison is unlikely to be the dominant mechanism.
The third mechanism wherein firms can observe information on physicians targeted
by their rivals predicts either an increase or decrease in payments as a result of dis-
closure. As a result, prima facie, this offers the most parsimonious description of the
observed pattern of the causal effect. Within this mechanism, I further investigate
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whether the effect was driven by firms imitating each other or differentiating from
each other. Under the former, rival firms would converge to similar payment levels for
each physician post disclosure, thereby reducing the variance in payments within each
physician. On the other hand, differentiation would have led to an increase in variance
of within-physician payments.
In order to understand how within physician payment disparity across drugs
changed as a result of disclosure, I fit another Causal Forest using Yi = GINI
POST
i −
GINIPREi as the outcome variable, which is the change in Gini index
20 for a physician
i. The Gini index measures the total disparity in payments that a physician receives
across all drugs during the pre and post periods. A low value of the Gini index would
suggest that all paying drugs patronize a physician almost equally. The estimate from
the Causal Forest, τˆGINIi , stands for the percentage change in the Gini index per physi-
cian due to the disclosure. This result suggests that the disparity in payments received
by a physician across drugs increased for all physicians who were paid by multiple
drugs (Table 3.8, last row). As a result, the payments a physician received from all
paying drugs becomes 4% more unequal, on average. Therefore, these results suggest
that the variance in payments received by each physician (as measured by the Gini
index) increased for all physicians in my sample subsequent to disclosure. Therefore, I
conjecture that disclosure of payments led to rival firms differentiating from each other
by choosing different sets of physicians that they target.
As noted earlier, my data preclude me from ruling out the possibility that a com-
bination of all three mechanisms drove the causal effect of disclosure. Therefore, my
discussion presents a preliminary exercise in evaluating the role of the three mech-
anisms in isolation. Given the data I have, I favor firm differentiation as the main
mechanism. I leave the formal test of mechanisms to future research.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
My essay studies the impact of making the industry payments to physicians public on
the subsequent payments between firms and physicians, and to what extent it effectively
solves the conflict-of-interest concern. I find that, on average, disclosing competitors’
marketing information leads to a decline by 2% in the monthly marketing payment per
physician-drug pair. Further investigation suggests that payments for heavier marketed
20For each physician i paid by Ni brands, her Gini index during period t is: GINI
t
i =
1
Ni
(Ni + 1−
2 ∗
∑Ni
d=1(Ni+1−d)∗Yd∑Ni
d=1 Yd
), where Yd is the total dollar amount the physician received from drug d during
period t.
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drugs, as well as physicians who were more heavily paid by multiple drugs and were
prescribing more anti-diabetics, tend to be less influenced by the disclosure. Mean-
while, the average payment disparity across brands within the same physician goes up,
with the low paying brands dropping payments more frequently than the high paying
brands. This pattern is consistent with the idea that firms respond to information
about competitive payments by trying to differentiate themselves. As any reputation
concerns that might impose negative pressure on physicians and firms have been in-
corporated immediately after the law introduction, firms and physicians could have
already adjusted the payments downward before the actual data disclosure. Thus, I
consider the 2% decline from my study a conservative estimate of the overall effect
from the disclosure law.
My study takes the first step in answering an important question about the well-
publicized disclosure law. However, data limitations leave some productive avenues for
future research. First, given the nature of my data, I stop short of directly linking
changes in monthly payments to changes in monthly prescriptions as I do not have
access to the latter. This prevents me from evaluating the return on marketing pay-
ments towards physicians pre- and post-disclosure in this paper, and from investigating
the mechanisms more thoroughly. Second, I do not have access to complete data on
the firm side, e.g. data on other marketing expenditures and the cost of disclosure
regulation. These data would enable me to comment on whether a change in payments
is linked to a change in other marketing expenditure. Finally, I’m also unable to com-
ment on the impact of disclosure on patient welfare, as I do not have access to health
outcomes. I hope that future research can address these limitations.
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CHAPTER 4
Summary and Outlook
Disclosure regulation has been chosen as a quick cure for Conflict-Of-Interest (COI) by
policy makers frequently, thanks to its easy implementation and non-intrusive nature.
The idea behind it is that making the COI information accessible to everyone generates
the public pressure, pushing agents under the influence away from further questionable
practice. However, the effectiveness of such regulation has been debated.
In my dissertation, I studied the disclosure of a specific form of information: mar-
keting payments to physicians from pharmaceutical firms and their rivals. My results
suggest that disclosure works, to a limited extent, in alleviating the COI in the industry-
physician relationship. On the one hand, the number of prescriptions of both branded
and generic drugs in Massachusetts drops with the relative magnitude of the drop being
higher for branded drugs (Essay 1). On the other hand, the monthly payment received
by a physician only declined by 2% on average, after the disclosure rolled out to all 50
states in the country (Essay 2).
The pattern of the results suggests that public pressure is not the only story behind
the changes in behavior. Given that bigger drugs and heavier prescribers are the least
influenced by the federal disclosure regulation, and that payments to the same physician
become more disperse after disclosure, firms seem to differentiate from each other
by allocating more resources towards physicians with whom they’ve already gained a
favorable position. This suggests that players in the market might strategically leverage
the information disclosed, which might lead to unexpected consequences from policy
makers’ perspective.
Is disclosure good or bad? To better answer the question, future research should
draw upon additional datasets to better characterize the agents’ behavior. To patients,
what is the change to the health outcome? To physicians, what is the (quantifiable)
penalty for COI practice? To firms, what is the benefit from learning about rivals’
behavior? To regulators, what is the cost of disclosure regulation? Will it create
privacy issues? Are there alternative strategies? I leave these questions to the readers.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter 2
In section A.1-A.4, I report additional robustness check results for chapter 2 with the
following subsamples.
Table A.1: Summary of robustness checks.
Section Sample used Purpose
A.1 MA-CT border counties, zipcode average corrects for parallel trends in pre-period
A.2 MA-NY border counties alternative control group
A.3 MA-CT border counties, pre-period is Jan-Jun 2009 alternative pre-period§
A.4 MA-CT border counties, DV is log transformed alternative data transformations¶
§Blue Cross Blue Shield introduced Alternative Quality Contract in Massachusetts starting 2009.
While my data is from a different insurance company and should not be influenced by changes in
BCBN, I check robustness of my findings using a pre-period that excludes the temporal point when
the changes occurred.¶I apply log transformations to account for potential skewness of the distribution
of residuals.
A.1 Generalized Synthetic Control Estimation.
Let Rxzt indicate the average monthly new prescriptions written per physician in zip-
code z and month t (1 to 48). I model the data generation process as:
Rxzt = Dztδz +Xztβ + FtΛz + zt
Where the treatment indicator Dzt equals 1 if zipcode z is from Massachusetts and
t is after month 18, and equals 0 otherwise. δz captures the heterogeneous treatment
effect for an average physician in zipcode z that is treated. Xzt includes a constant term
and the average monthly patients per physician receiving any new prescriptions at the
zipcode. It captures the time-varying demand shocks such as a local insurance plan
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membership expansion. Ft = [f1t, ..., frt]
′ is a vector of r unobserved common factors
(each have T values, T=48), with Λz = [λz1, ..., λzr]
′ the (r x 1) vector of unknown
factor loadings. Note that the treated and control units are influenced by the same
set of factors, and the number of factors is fixed throughout month 1 to 48. However,
each zipcode can have a different set of loadings on r factors. Note that zipcode fixed
effects and time fixed effects can be considered as two special cases of the unobserved
factors by setting ft = 1 and λz = 1.
A.1.1 Model Estimation
The model is estimated following three steps (Xu, 2017):
Step 1: Obtain the estimated coefficients on X, the factors, and the
loadings using only the control group data.
(βˆ, Fˆ , Λˆco) = argmin
∑
z∈co(Rxzt − Xztβ − FtΛz)′(Rxzt − Xztβ − FtΛz), z ∈
Control State
s.t.F ′F/T = Ir,Λ′zΛz = diagonal.
Step 2: Given the estimated coefficients on X and the factors from step 1,
obtain the factor loadings for each treated unit using only the pre-treatment
period data.
λˆz = argmin(Rxzt0 −Xzt0 βˆ − Fˆt0λz)′(Rxzt0 −Xzt0 βˆ − Fˆt0λz), z ∈MA.
Step 3: Calculate treated counterfactuals for the post-treatment period,
based on βˆ, Fˆ , ΛˆMA.
Rˆxzt1(0) = Xzt1 βˆ + Fˆt1Λˆz, z ∈MA.
Finally, I obtain an estimator for Average Treatment Effect on the Treated by av-
eraging the differences in the observed and counterfactual outcomes across all zipcodes
in MA during the post-treatment period: ˆATT t1 =
1
Nz∈MA
∑
z∈MA[Rxzt1(1)− ˆRxzt1(0)].
The number of factors, r, is determined by a leave-one-out-cross-validation proce-
dure in step 2. Intuitively, the algorithm iteratively goes through all pre-periods, holds
back one period’s data of all treated units in step 2, estimates the loadings, predicts
the outcomes for the holdout sample, and obtain the mean squared prediction error
(MSPE) for the treated units given r: MSPE(r) =
∑T0
s=1
∑
z∈MA
Rxzs(0)−Rˆxzs(0)
T0
. After
trying a set of values for r, pick r∗ that minimizes the MSPE for the treated units in
the pre-periods.
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A.1.2 Model Inference
The inference is done by constructing the variance and the confidence interval for
ˆATT t1through bootstrapping. The intuition follows the placebo test in the traditional
synthetic control method: construct an empirical distribution of prediction errors for
the GSC method, and evaluate if the true ˆATT t1 looks different enough from the pre-
diction errors for the effect to be real.
Step 1: Simulate the prediction errors for the treated units.
At each iteration m, one control unit is randomly drawn to be the “pseudo-treated”
unit (unit i), and the new control donor pool (of the same size as the original donor
pool) for this “pseudo-treated” unit is generated by re-sampling with replacement from
the remaining control units. Apply the GSC method and obtain the vector of residuals
for this “pseudo-treated” unit: ˆp(m) = Rxi− Rˆxi(0), for iteration round m and pseudo-
treated unit i. Do this for B1 times, and collect all B1 vectors of predictions errors:
eˆp = {ˆp(1), ..., ˆp(B1)}. This is the constructed sample of prediction errors for the treated
units. Note that from the estimation part, I have already obtained the original set of
residuals for the control units:eˆ = {ˆ1, ..., ˆNco}.
Step 2: Construct bootstrapped samples of untreated outcomes and ob-
tain ˆATT
(k)
t1
.
Start a new bootstrap loop for B2 times. At each round k, construct a bootstrapped
sample S(k) of untreated outcomes using βˆ, Fˆ , Λˆ from the estimation part and the
simulated errors from last step:
R˜x
(k)
i (0) = Xiβˆ + Fˆ λˆi + ˜i, i ∈ Control
R˜x
(k)
j (0) = Xjβˆ + Fˆ λˆj + ˜
p
j , j ∈ Treated
where ˜i, ˜
p
j are randomly drawn from the prediction error sets eˆ and eˆ
p. Ap-
ply the GSC method to S(k) and obtain a new ˆATT
(k)
null. Because the bootstrapped
treated counterfactuals do not contain the treatment effect, I add back the esti-
mated ATT estimate to obtain the corresponding ATT estimate for this round k:
ˆATT
(k)
t1
= ˆATT
(k)
null + ˆATT t1.
Step 3: Compute the variance of ˆATT t1.
V ar( ˆATTt|D,X,Λ, F ) = 1B2
∑B2
k=1(
ˆATT
(k)
t − 1B2
∑B2
j=1
ˆATT
(j)
t )
2
Its confidence interval is obtained using percentile method as in Efron and Tibshi-
rani (1994). Xu (2017) has shown in Monte Carlo exercises that GSC estimator has less
bias than the DID estimator in the presence of unobserved, decomposable time-varying
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confounders and is more efficient than the original synthetic matching estimator. When
the sample is large enough (T0 > 10 and Nco > 40),
1 the cross-validation procedure
recovers the correct number of factors reasonably well. 2
A.2 Results from MA-NY border counties.
Figure A.1: MA-NY border counties.
Berkshire, Franklin, Hampshire, Hampden (MA); Columbia, Rensselaer, Albany,
Greene (NY).
1In my case, I have T0 = 18, and N
statin
co = 95, N
antidepr
co = 103, N
antipsych
co = 90, for MA-CT
border counties. These numbers for MA-NY border counties are: 62, 67, and 47.
2I implement the above estimation and inference procedures in R using -gsynth- package.
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Table A.3: Panel regression results in MA-NY border counties.
(a) Statins.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0191*** -0.0173*** -0.0220*** -0.0215*** -0.0248*** -0.0252***
(0.00655) (0.00656) (0.00779) (0.00778) (0.00828) (0.00829)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0136 -0.0118 -0.00983 -0.00930 -0.00549 -0.00585
(0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0142) (0.0139)
Monthly total patients 0.00553*** 0.00577*** 0.00602***
(0.000918) (0.000981) (0.00102)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -27.0% -25.0% -29.2% -28.7% -31.2% -31.5%
ATE%, generics -9.8% -8.6% -6.3% -6.0% -3.3% -3.5%
N 100,992 100,992 75,744 75,744 67,328 67,328
(b) Antidepressants.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0116** -0.0122** -0.00760 -0.00929 -0.00560 -0.00806
(0.00515) (0.00514) (0.00609) (0.00604) (0.00629) (0.00625)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0332*** -0.0337*** -0.0349** -0.0366** -0.0350** -0.0375**
(0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0165) (0.0162)
Monthly total patients 0.00328*** 0.00335*** 0.00356***
(0.00115) (0.00119) (0.00116)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -41.1% -42.2% -31.0% -35.4% -23.7% -30.9%
ATE%, generics -17.1% -17.3% -16.9% -17.6% -16.7% -17.6%
N 129,216 129,216 96,912 96,912 86,144 86,144
(c) Antipsychotics.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0487** -0.0475** -0.0609** -0.0606** -0.0629** -0.0635**
(0.0227) (0.0225) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0303) (0.0300)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0372** -0.0360** -0.0345* -0.0343* -0.0329* -0.0335*
(0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0187)
Monthly total patients 0.00219 0.00240 0.00252
(0.00154) (0.00168) (0.00160)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -34.5% -33.9% -41.6% -41.5% -41.8% -42.1%
ATE%, generics -52.3% -51.5% -46.7% -46.5% -44.5% -44.9%
N 33,120 33,120 24,840 24,840 22,080 22,080
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (Nov 22, 2010).
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Table A.4: Brand-specific effects in MA-NY border counties.
(a) Statins.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Top 1 brand (Lipitor) -27.6%*** -26.3%** -29.3%** -29.0%** -30.8%** -31.0%**
ATE, Top 2 brand (Crestor) -27.2% -23.5% -29.9%* -29.0% -32.7%* -33.2%*
ATE, Generic Rx -9.8% -8.6% -6.3% -6.0% -3.3% -3.5%
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 201,984 201,984 151,488 151,488 134,656 134,656
(b) Antidepressants.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Top 1 brand (Lexapro) -31.5% -32.8% 18.4% 6.0% 44.4% 20.6%
ATE, Top 2 brand (Cymbalta) -36.7%* -37.6%* -39.2% -41.7%* -33.1% -37.1%
ATE, Generic Rx -17.1%*** -17.3%*** -16.9%** -17.6%** -16.7%** -17.6%**
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 323,040 323,040 242,280 242,280 215,360 215,360
Pristiq is lumped into “other brands” due to insufficient observations on MA-NY border.
(c) Antipsychotics.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Top 1 brand (Seroquel) -27.9% -27.5% -31.8% -31.7% -31.3% -31.6%
ATE, Top 2 brand (Abilify) -47.4%** -46.6%** -54.4%** -54.2%* -51.7%* -52.0%*
ATE, Top 3 brand (Zyprexa) -22.5% -20.8% -27.8% -27.4% -41.2% -41.9%
ATE, Generic Rx -52.3%** -51.5%** -46.7%* -46.5%* -44.5%* -44.9%*
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 82,800 82,800 62,100 62,100 55,200 55,200
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (November 22, 2010).
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Table A.5: Heterogeneous effects across physician groups on prescriptions, on MA-NY
border.
(a) Statins.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx, Light -8.3% -19.7% -12.0% -24.2% -24.1% -32.8%
ATE, Branded Rx, Medium -32.4%** -7.1% -34.2%** -8.2% -36.8%*** -11.5%
ATE, Branded Rx, Heavy -28.4%*** -27.5%*** -30.3%*** -30.8%*** -28.4%*** -29.8%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Light -37.5%*** -38.6%*** -39.2%** -40.5%*** -45.8%*** -46.8%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Medium -38.6%*** -34.3%*** -40.0%*** -35.6%*** -44.5%*** -40.2%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Heavy -2.6% -2.5% 5.1% 4.8% 12.3% 11.7%
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 130,368 130,368 97,776 97,776 86,912 86,912
(b) Antidepressants.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx, Light 9.9% 14.9% 47.2% 31.7% 52.4% 33.0%
ATE, Branded Rx, Medium -44.0% -32.2% -22.8% -21.8% -18.4% -16.1%
ATE, Branded Rx, Heavy -28.0%** -29.9%*** -28.1%** -34.0%*** -24.3%* -32.3%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Light -12.7% -11.8% -22.6% -22.0% -20.8% -20.2%
ATE, Generic Rx, Medium -20.8%* -20.9%* -21.3% -21.5% -22.5% -22.6%
ATE, Generic Rx, Heavy -26.9%*** -27.1%*** -25.5%*** -25.8%*** -25.8%*** -26.2%***
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 257,472 257,472 193,104 193,104 171,648 171,648
(c) Antipsychotics.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx, Light -28.7% 8.2% -53.9% -23.1% -58.5% -35.1%
ATE, Branded Rx, Medium -50.8%* -53.1%** -63.2%** -64.4%** -63.1%* -64.3%**
ATE, Branded Rx, Heavy -44.3%*** -45.5%*** -54.2%*** -54.9%*** -56.9%*** -57.4%***
ATE, Generic Rx, Light -38.0% -32.3% -36.4% -30.5% -31.8% -26.6%
ATE, Generic Rx, Medium -66.7%** -67.3%** -66.9%* -67.5%* -64.0%* -64.6%*
ATE, Generic Rx, Heavy -57.5%** -57.7%** -55.3%** -55.4%** -55.8%*** -56.0%***
Monthly total patients NO YES NO YES NO YES
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
N 61,824 61,824 46,368 46,368 41,216 41,216
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3 different temporal points: (1) when the data collection
began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1,
2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (November 22, 2010).
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A.3 Results from MA-CT border counties, with
January - June 2009 as pre-period.
Table A.6: Panel regression results on MA-CT border, using Jan-Jun2009 as pre-
period.
(a) Statins.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0831*** -0.0617*** -0.122*** -0.0839*** -0.145*** -0.0969***
(0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0141) (0.0150) (0.0156) (0.0165)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.130*** -0.108*** -0.185*** -0.147*** -0.215*** -0.167***
(0.0159) (0.0153) (0.0227) (0.0216) (0.0259) (0.0242)
Monthly total patients 0.0234*** 0.0256*** 0.0257***
(0.00327) (0.00337) (0.00351)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -50.3% -42.9% -60.0% -50.8% -63.2% -53.5%
ATE%, generics -42.2% -37.9% -48.8% -43.1% -50.8% -44.5%
N 168,480 168,480 112,320 112,320 93,600 93,600
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated at the mean.
§Treatments are measured by: (1) when the data collection began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first reported
their payment to the government (July 1, 2010), and (3) when the data were made available to the public (Nov 22,
2010).
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Table A.6: Panel regression results on MA-CT border, using Jan-Jun2009 as pre-period
(Continued).
(b) Antidepressants.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0267*** -0.0118 -0.0377*** -0.0141 -0.0441*** -0.0143
(0.00761) (0.00842) (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0109) (0.0132)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.127*** -0.112*** -0.186*** -0.162*** -0.206*** -0.177***
(0.0261) (0.0250) (0.0322) (0.0308) (0.0347) (0.0331)
Monthly total patients 0.0190*** 0.0204*** 0.0218***
(0.00308) (0.00325) (0.00343)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -46.5% -27.7% -55.0% -31.4% -58.0% -30.9%
ATE%, generics -31.1% -28.5% -39.7% -36.5% -41.4% -37.7%
N 221,328 221,328 147,552 147,552 122,960 122,960
(c) Antipsychotics.
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0849** -0.0477 -0.106** -0.0521 -0.101** -0.0389
(0.0383) (0.0351) (0.0430) (0.0399) (0.0443) (0.0415)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0720*** -0.0348 -0.0868*** -0.0327 -0.0905*** -0.0281
(0.0238) (0.0228) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0277) (0.0280)
Monthly total patients 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0264***
(0.00460) (0.00566) (0.00570)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -36.0% -24.0% -43.2% -27.2% -40.9% -21.0%
ATE%, generics -45.9% -29.1% -49.2% -26.7% -49.6% -23.4%
N 78,912 78,912 52,608 52,608 43,840 43,840
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. Standard Errors clustered at physician level. ATE% calculated
at the mean. §Treatments are measured by: (1) when the data collection began on July 1, 2009, (2)
when the firms first reported their payment to the government (July 1, 2010), and (3) when the data
were made available to the public (Nov 22, 2010).
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A.4 Results from MA-CT border counties with log
transformations.
Table A.7: Panel regression results for statins.
(a) Y = log(Rx+ 1)
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0524*** -0.0409*** -0.0706*** -0.0551*** -0.0817*** -0.0634***
(0.00470) (0.00439) (0.00608) (0.00559) (0.00677) (0.00621)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0585*** -0.0471*** -0.0814*** -0.0658*** -0.0944*** -0.0761***
(0.00620) (0.00572) (0.00834) (0.00759) (0.00942) (0.00852)
Monthly total patients 0.00642*** 0.00660*** 0.00666***
(0.00104) (0.00116) (0.00122)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -44.1% -38.1% -53.4% -45.7% -56.8% -48.6%
ATE%, generics -33.6% -29.6% -40.0% -34.7% -42.2% -36.3%
N 224,640 224,640 168,480 168,480 149,760 149,760
(b) Y = log(Rx+
√
Rx2 + 1)
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0678*** -0.0531*** -0.0916*** -0.0715*** -0.106*** -0.0824***
(0.00607) (0.00566) (0.00786) (0.00723) (0.00877) (0.00803)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0756*** -0.0608*** -0.105*** -0.0852*** -0.122*** -0.0987***
(0.00799) (0.00738) (0.0107) (0.00978) (0.0121) (0.0110)
Monthly total patients 0.00828*** 0.00851*** 0.00859***
(0.00134) (0.00149) (0.00158)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -44.4% -38.5% -53.7% -46.1% -57.2% -49.0%
ATE%, generics -33.7% -29.8% -40.2% -34.9% -42.4% -36.5%
N 224,640 224,640 168,480 168,480 149,760 149,760
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. ATE% calculated at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3
different temporal points: (1) when the data collection began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first
reported their payment to the government (July 1, 2010), and (3) when the data were made available
to the public (November 22, 2010).
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Table A.8: Panel regression results for antidepressants.
(a) Y = log(Rx+ 1)
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0213*** -0.0175*** -0.0267*** -0.0213*** -0.0307*** -0.0243***
(0.00316) (0.00341) (0.00402) (0.00429) (0.00441) (0.00473)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0469*** -0.0431*** -0.0674*** -0.0620*** -0.0768*** -0.0704***
(0.00681) (0.00666) (0.00860) (0.00840) (0.00935) (0.00912)
Monthly total patients 0.00459*** 0.00453*** 0.00455***
(0.000768) (0.000820) (0.000849)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -42.3% -31.1% -50.3% -36.6% -54.0% -39.5%
ATE%, generics -21.2% -18.8% -28.6% -25.6% -31.1% -27.7%
N 295,104 295,104 221,328 221,328 196,736 196,736
(b) Y = log(Rx+
√
Rx2 + 1)
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0274*** -0.0226*** -0.0345*** -0.0276*** -0.0397*** -0.0315***
(0.00407) (0.00438) (0.00517) (0.00551) (0.00568) (0.00608)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0600*** -0.0552*** -0.0864*** -0.0795*** -0.0986*** -0.0904***
(0.00871) (0.00853) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0117)
Monthly total patients 0.00588*** 0.00580*** 0.00583***
(0.000981) (0.00105) (0.00109)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -42.6% -31.5% -50.6% -37.1% -54.3% -40.0%
ATE%, generics -21.1% -18.7% -28.5% -25.5% -31.0% -27.6%
N 295,104 295,104 221,328 221,328 196,736 196,736
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. ATE% calculated at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3
different temporal points: (1) when the data collection began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first
reported their payment to the government (July 1, 2010), and (3) when the data were made available
to the public (November 22, 2010).
92
Table A.9: Panel regression results for antipsychotics.
(a) Y = log(Rx+ 1)
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0461*** -0.0378*** -0.0566*** -0.0451*** -0.0553*** -0.0421***
(0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0147) (0.0143)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0289*** -0.0206** -0.0355*** -0.0240** -0.0389*** -0.0257**
(0.00826) (0.00871) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0112)
Monthly total patients 0.00670*** 0.00611*** 0.00595***
(0.00148) (0.00144) (0.00140)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -26.6% -16.1% -33.7% -20.7% -31.8% -16.2%
ATE%, generics -36.6% -22.3% -39.8% -22.4% -41.4% -21.9%
N 105,216 105,216 78,912 78,912 70,144 70,144
(b) Y = log(Rx+
√
Rx2 + 1)
Treatment Measure§ 1 1 2 2 3 3
ATE, Branded Rx -0.0590*** -0.0483*** -0.0724*** -0.0577*** -0.0709*** -0.0540***
(0.0158) (0.0153) (0.0180) (0.0174) (0.0188) (0.0183)
ATE, Generic Rx -0.0371*** -0.0265** -0.0456*** -0.0310** -0.0501*** -0.0332**
(0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0130) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0144)
Monthly total patients 0.00858*** 0.00782*** 0.00763***
(0.00189) (0.00184) (0.00179)
Brand-year-month FE YES
Physician-brand FE YES
ATE%, branded -26.3% -15.7% -33.4% -20.4% -31.6% -16.0%
ATE%, generics -36.6% -22.4% -39.8% -22.6% -41.5% -22.2%
N 105,216 105,216 78,912 78,912 70,144 70,144
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. ATE% calculated at the mean. §Treatments are measured by 3
different temporal points: (1) when the data collection began on July 1, 2009, (2) when the firms first
reported their payment to the government (July 1, 2010), and (3) when the data were made available
to the public (November 22, 2010).
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 3
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Figure B.1: Age-Adjusted Percentage of Adults with Diabetes, 1994-2015.
(a) MA and CT.
(b) VT and NH.
(c) MN and WI.
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
https://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/diabetes/DiabetesAtlas.html
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Table B.1: Drug Information.
Brand Name Manufacturer Subclass Initial Approval Date
APIDRA Sanofi Insulin 4/16/2004
BYDUREON AstraZeneca GLP1 receptor agonist 1/27/2012
FARXIGA AstraZeneca SGLT2 inhibitor 1/8/2014
HUMALOG Eli Lilly Insulin 6/14/1996
INVOKANA Janssen SGLT2 inhibitor 3/29/2013
JANUMET Merck DPP4 inhibitor 4/2/2007
JANUVIA Merck DPP4 inhibitor 10/17/2006
LANTUS Sanofi Insulin 4/20/2000
LEVEMIR Novo Nordisk Insulin 6/16/2005
NESINA Takeda DPP4 inhibitor 1/25/2013
NOVOLOG Novo Nordisk Insulin 6/7/2000
ONGLYZA AstraZeneca DPP4 inhibitor 7/31/2009
OSENI Takeda DPP4 inhibitor 1/25/2013
TANZEUM GSK GLP1 receptor agonist 4/15/2014
TRADJENTA BI and Eli Lilly DPP4 inhibitor 5/2/2011
VICTOZA Novo Nordisk GLP1 receptor agonist 1/26/2010
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B.1 Relationship between Payment Changes and
Nature of Payments.
In my sample, six major payment purposes are recorded in the nature of payment field:
consulting fee, speaker events, food and beverage, education, travel and lodging, and
honoraria (table 3.2). While payments for physicians serving as a speaker cost firms
the most money (63% of the total dollar amount), payments for food and beverage
covers more than 98% of the physician population in my sample (49,085). Note that
my sample does not include any research-related expenditure.
One conjecture is that physicians receiving more controversial payments (i.e. pay-
ments suffering more from COI) are more influenced by the disclosure regulation.
Physicians’ service as a speaker for the industry has long been debated (e.g. Bren-
nan et al., 2006), especially because they tend to be sizable and can influence peer
physicians. On the other hand, sponsorship for attending continuing education pro-
grams and conferences may be viewed as more legitimate. If this is indeed the case,
I will see in the data that physicians predominantly paid for consulting/speaker ser-
vices are the most responsive to the disclosure than physicians mostly paid under other
categories.
I characterize each physician by the shares of different nature of payment she re-
ceived pre-disclosure from all drugs. That is, for each physician, I compute the share
of payments received for a particular reason during the pre-disclosure period. Each
person can thus be characterized by a vector of shares based on various reasons she got
paid before. I regress the estimated payment change per physician-drug pair onto the
vector of shares across different payment reasons to understand which reason makes the
physician more sensitive to the disclosure. Specifically, I run the following specification
with the share of travel expenditure as the omitted baseline:
τˆ payid = α1SpeakerSharei + α2ConsultingSharei + α3HonorariaSharei+
α4FoodSharei + α5EducationSharei + α6LogPreUSDi +X
′
iβ + Id + ξid.
(B.1)
For each physician, I control for the total dollars received pre-disclosure (in log), the
basic physician characteristics (gender, medical school graduation year, size of the
associated practice group, and number of claim-based hospitals), and allow for common
drug fixed effects. I cluster errors by physicians.
As is reported in table B.2, a unit increase in the share of speaker fees received by a
physician is associated with the largest decline in payment percentage. On the contrary,
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a unit increase in the share of sponsorship for continuing medical education is associated
with the smallest decline/largest increase in payment percentage. This is consistent
with the public notion that compensated for serving as a speaker for the industry is
the least legitimate while sponsored for attending continuing education programs is the
most legitimate. The data pattern also suggests that physicians mainly receiving food
and beverage show a smaller decline/larger increase in the post-disclosure payments
compared to physicians mainly receiving travel benefits.
I would like to caution readers that there could be explanations for the same data
pattern other than the perceived legitimacy. For example, the speaker payments are
the largest in dollar amount, while its ROI (return-on-investment) may be less straight-
forward. Firms might thus decide to cut down these payments. With the current data,
I could not and would not prove which explanation is the most correct. I leave this to
future research.
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Table B.2: Relationship between Payment Changes and Nature of Payments.
DV = τˆ payid (1) (2)
Share of Payment Received by a Physician
Speaker -0.0160*** -0.0141***
(0.00563) (0.00541)
Consulting -0.00201 0.000342
(0.00622) (0.00599)
Honoraria 0.0140 0.0142
(0.0160) (0.0154)
Food&Beverage 0.0195*** 0.0220***
(0.00523) (0.00502)
Education 0.0222*** 0.0253***
(0.00534) (0.00513)
physician control variables:
Total Pre-Disclosure Payment (log$) 0.00547*** 0.00565***
(0.000115) (0.000116)
Female -0.000622***
(0.000231)
Medical School Graduation Year 0.000121***
(9.77e-06)
Practise Group Size 9.29e-06***
(1.07e-06)
Number of Hospitals -0.000200***
(6.85e-05)
Intercept -0.0726*** -0.317***
(0.00532) (0.0201)
Observations 199,085 199,085
Drug FE YES YES
R2 0.856 0.857
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by physician.
Share of travel expenditure per physician is the omitted baseline.
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